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I. INTRODUCTION
In a decision that shocked the inter-American human rights world, the
Argentinean Supreme Court in February 2017 refused to comply with an Inter-
American Court of Human Rights decision ordering it to revoke a domestic
judgment. At issue was a case in which Argentina's Supreme Court had affirmed
a civil judgment that found two journalists liable for defamation for publishing
stories about an unacknowledged child of former President Carlos Menem in
2001. Ten years later, the Inter-American Court found that the Argentinean
Supreme Court's affirmation of the civil judgment against the journalists
violated the journalists' right to freedom of expression under the American
Convention on Human Rights-the region's core human rights treaty. The Inter-
American Court ordered Argentina's Supreme Court to "revoke the decision in
its entirety."' In 2016, Argentina's president asked the Supreme Court to comply
with the Inter-American Court's decision and revoke the 2001 ruling, but the
Supreme Court declined to do so, arguing that the Inter-American Court lacked
the authority to order the revocation of a domestic judgment.2
The Argentinean court's decision was particularly striking because, in
2017, Argentina had one of the most progressive domestic courts in the region
and was refusing to comply an international court's binding decision. The Inter-
American Court responded by indicating that Argentina could find other ways to
comply with the international court's judgment 3 other than "reviewing" the 2001
decision-for instance, making an annotation on the margin of the Court's
opinion. The Supreme Court ultimately agreed to the human rights tribunal's
"suggestion," seemingly putting an end to the stand-off between the two courts.4
A year later, an ultra-conservative pastor in Costa Rica turned presidential
candidate rose from having merely four percent support in the polls to winning
the run-off in only one month. His message was simple: if he became president,
he would pull Costa Rica out of the Inter-American Court's jurisdiction.' The
1. Fontevecchia and D'Amico v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 238, ¶ 105 (Nov. 29, 2011). The Court also ordered the State to publish and
disseminate the Court's decision, id. 1 107-08, and to reimburse the amounts paid by each of the victims
as a result of their civil conviction, id. ¶ 116.
2. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
14/2/2017, "Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto s/ informe sentencia dictada en el caso
'Fontevecchia y D'Amico c. Argentina' por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos," CSJ
368/1998 (34-M)/CS1 (Arg.).
3. Fontevecchia and D'Amico v. Argentina, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Considering ¶ 21 (Oct. 18, 2017).
4. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
5/12/2017, "Expediente No. 6439/12," Res. No. 4015/17, ESC/41218/2017, at 2 (Arg.).
S. Latin America's Human-Rights Court Moves into Touchy Territory, THE ECONOMIST (Feb.
1, 2018), https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2018/02/01/latin-americas-human-rights-court-
moves-into-touchy-territory.
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move would have been particularly embarrassing for the country because the
Inter-American Court itself sits in San Jos6, Costa Rica. But the claim gained
support particularly because an Inter-American Court advisory opinion had
declared that Costa Rica-and every State of the Americas-should legalize
same-sex marriage and allow name changes for transgender individuals.6
Although the conservative anti-Court candidate eventually lost to the official
candidate sixty to forty percent, his campaign's success was shocking because it
was unforeseeable that the Inter-American Court could have ignited so much
resistance with its decision in only a matter of weeks.
These examples are just some of the latest developments in a series of
episodes of resistance from members of the Organization of American States
against international human rights bodies-a pattern that other international
courts have also been struggling with. In 2012, after several judgments handed
down by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Venezuela denounced the
American Convention-just as Trinidad & Tobago did in 1998, and Peru did
partially in 1999. In 2014, the Constitutional Court of the Dominican Republic
ruled against its State's acceptance of the Inter-American Court's compulsory
jurisdiction. Between 2011 and 2013, States' discontent with some inter-
American decisions triggered an unprecedented process of revising the human
rights system's organs-the so-called "strengthening process," which both
advocates and scholars saw as an effort to weaken the system's powers. In 2017,
the U.S. government decided not to participate in hearings that the Inter-
American Commission held on various human rights issues concerning the
country.8 Until then, the United States had always appeared before the
Commission.
Legal scholars are increasingly paying attention to what they see as the
"decline" 9 or "twilight"10 of international human rights law, or even the end" of
what Louis Henkin famously called "the age of human rights.,,1 2 Commentators
6. Identidad de g6nero, e igualdad y no discriminaci6n a parejas del mismo sexo [Gender
Identity, and Equality and Non-Discrimination to Same-Sex Couples], Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 24 (Nov. 24, 2017).
7. See infra Part III.
8. Elise Foley, Trump Administration Is a No-Show at Hearings on Human Rights,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-administration-
iachr us 58dl7201e4b0be71dcf8b27b. The United States is not a party to the American Convention on
Human Rights. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123. It is, however, a member of the Organization of American States and a signatory to the
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man. Int'l Conference of American States, American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948), https://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/
English/Basic2.American%20Declaration.htm.
9. See Ingrid Wuerth, International Law in the Post-Human Rights Era, 96 TEX. L. REV. 279,
319 (2017) (observing that "[h]uman rights, and especially .. . their enforcement through international
law, are in a period of stasis and decline").
10. See ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014). Cf BETH A.
SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009); Beth
A. Simmons, What's Right with Human Rights, 35 DEMOCRACY (Winter 2015),
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/35/whats-right-with-human-rights/.
11. See Makau Mutua, Is the Age of Human Rights Over?, in ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO
LITERATURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 450, 455 (Sophia A. McClennen et al. eds., 2016) (arguing that "the
human rights era has ended").
12. In 1990, Louis Henkin wrote that human rights was "the idea of our time, the only political
1812019]
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have warned about the risks of backlash against human rights,' 3 examining
instances of resistance in Europel4 and Africa' 5 as well as examining the
notorious case of the United States' exceptionalist attitude towards international
law.16 The situation of Latin America, however, remains unstudied,
notwithstanding the fact that the region hosts one of the most active international
human rights mechanisms in the world. This Article fills that gap in two ways.
First, it identifies and analyzes the growing and multi-layered forms of resistance
that the inter-American human rights system faces. In particular, it identifies
three forms of resistance: frontal backlash, covert resistance, and judicial
pushback. Second, it develops two avenues for reform to counteract what could
constitute a major setback for the protection of human rights in the region.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I discuss both the rise of human
rights law generally as well as the expansive influence of human rights law
within inter-American law. I show how national constitutions and subsequently
national courts in Latin America have embraced international human rights law
as a key element of constitutional adjudication, making international law "the
law of the land." Specifically, I look at the Inter-American Court's development
of its anti-amnesty doctrine as a crucial tool for the domestic fight against
impunity. In Part III, I explore the trend of challenging the project of
international law and how this process particularly affects human rights law. I
analyze instances of resistance and pushback in both Europe and Africa in order
to situate the discussion of the inter-American human rights system that follows.
In Part IV, I describe multiple forms of resistance, from full and partial
withdrawal from the treaty regime to the more nuanced instances of judicial
resistance by domestic courts. In Part V, I suggest avenues for reform. I re-
examine the "fourth instance" doctrine, whereby international courts should not
act as an additional instance of judicial review of domestic proceedings, and I
argue for the adoption of a political mechanism for monitoring compliance
similar to the European Committee of Ministers, which is charged with the task
moral idea that has received universal acceptance." LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS xvii
(1990).
13. See Hurst Hannum, Reinvigorating Human Rights for the Twenty-First Century, 16 HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 409, 413 (2016) (noting that calls by human rights activists "for adherence to the
contemporary liberal European construct of society is likely to create a backlash in the rest of the world").
14. See, e.g., RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE STRASBOURG
EFFECT (Lauri Malksoo & Wolfgang Benedek eds., 2017) (describing the evolution of the relationship
between Russia and the European Court of Human Rights); Mikael Rask Madsen, The Challenging
Authority of the European Court of Human Rights: From Cold War Legal Diplomacy to the Brighton
Declaration and Backlash, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141 (2016) (describing pushback against the
European Court of Human Rights by, among others, the UK and Russia); Susan Marks, Backlash: The
Undeclared War Against Human Rights, 4 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 319 (2014) (discussing UK backlash
against the European Court of Human Rights).
15. See Karen J. Alter, James T. Gathii & Laurence R. Helfer, Backlash Against International
Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and (Consequences, 27 EUR. J. INT'L L. 293 (2016)
(describing three instances of African countries resisting international courts).
16. See Oona Hathaway et al., International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts,
37 YALE J. INT'L L. 51, 68 (2012) ("The global human rights revolution and the very public backlash
against it . .. led to greater wariness among the courts to find that such treaties created private rights of
action in U.S. courts."). Cf Sabrina Safrin, The Un-Exceptionalism ofU.S. Exceptionalism, 41 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1307 (2008) (arguing that countries in general, including the United States, view
themselves as "exceptional" with regard to international law).
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of ensuring that States enforce regional human rights judgments. Part VI
concludes.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW COMES TO THE AMERICAS
A. The Rise ofInternational Human Rights
The contemporaneous story of international human rights law is a story of
humankind becoming aware of the devastating impact of mass atrocities on
human dignity and taking action to prevent future atrocities. "Human rights"
became the moral, political, and legal device to address the horrors of World War
II. "Humankind" was represented in the convening of mostly, though not
exclusively, Western nations that adopted a universal instrument establishing
"human rights."17 The "lingua franca of global moral thought," as Michael
Ignatieff has put it, was thus born.' 8 The United States, through the work of First
Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, in alliance with a handful of States, served as a key
ideological force behind the enactment of human rights-that is, a set of
entitlements that would apply to all persons, notwithstanding their nationality,
creed, race, sex, ethnicity, and social condition.' 9
Resistance to this universal project was apparent as soon as talks on a
universal human rights instrument began. The most famous critique came from
the Executive Board of the American Association of Anthropology's "Statement
on Human Rights," submitted to the United Nations in 1947, a year before the
adoption of the Universal Declaration.20 The Statement "warned the United
Nations against adopting a universal bill of rights that did not attend to cultural
,,21
particularities.
Nonetheless, the United Nations moved forward and adopted the Universal
Declaration. Scholars tend to refer to 1948 as the decisive moment in which the
international human rights movement was born, although more recent accounts
dispute that narrative.2 2 In any event, at least two decades after the adoption of
17. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
18. Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, in HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS
AND IDOLATRY 53, 53 (Amy Gutman ed., 2001).
19. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001) (describing the history of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights); JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
ORIGINS, DRAFTING, AND INTENT (2000) (focusing on the influences on the drafting process of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
20. Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association, Statement on Human
Rights, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 539 (1947).
21. Karen Engle, From Skepticism to Embrace: Human Rights and the American
Anthropological Association from 1947-1999, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 536, 537 (2001). In 1999, the American
Anthropological Association published a "Declaration on Anthropology and Human Rights," expressing
"a commitment to human rights consistent with international principles but not limited by them."
Declaration on Anthropology and Human Rights Committee for Human Rights American Anthropological
Association, AM. ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASS'N (June 1999), https://www.americananthro.org
/ConnectWithAAA/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=1880.
22. Samuel Moyn has argued that it was not until the 1970s that human rights as we understand
them today really took hold. He claims that the Universal Declaration's impact on international relations
and national law was limited, certainly less than what most commentators argue. See SAMUEL MOYN, THE
LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010).
1832019]
184 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 44: 2
the Universal Declaration, human rights began developing in impressive ways
with the adoption of two international covenants: one covenant addressing civil
and political rights and the other addressing economic, social, and cultural
rights.23 With the two covenants and the Declaration, an international bill of
human rights was developed.
Human rights continued to expand, mainly through international treaties
24 25 26that addressed racial discrimination, women's rights,2  torture, children's
27
rights, and other areas of concern. Regional human rights courts were
established in both Europe and Latin America, and alongside treaty bodies, 28
became a moral watchtower over the domestic protection of rights. International
non-governmental organizations successfully pushed rights-based agendas,
forcing States to account for human rights violations using the language of law.
Human rights were not just a set of moral principles-they were the law.
By the end of the 1980s the theory and practice of human rights seemed
uncontestable. By then, the European Court of Human Rights had developed a
rich case law that effectively held States accountable for human rights
violations.29 In the Americas, the Inter-American Court had just started handing
down decisions against States for their failure to observe their obligations under
the American Convention on Human Rights.30 The Inter-American Commission,
the other human rights body in the inter-American system, was credited with
putting pressure on the Argentinean military junta at the end of the 1970s by
documenting human rights violations, thereby contributing to the junta's
demise. New constitutions in Latin America embraced human rights as a core
23. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. No.
95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3.
24. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7,
1966, S. TREATY DOC. 95-18, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
25. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18,
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
26. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
27. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
28. Treaty bodies are typically the organs that international treaties create to monitor
compliance with the obligations that stem from a particular treaty. Thus, the Human Rights Committee,
for example, monitors compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, while
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Committee
monitors compliance with CEDAW. Treaty bodies issue general comments on specific treaty provisions
and some may address individual complaints from individuals.
29. See DIVERSITY AND EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS (Eva Brems ed., 2013) (critiquing
judgments and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights); MARK JANIS ET AL., EUROPEAN
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS (2008) (reviewing fifty years of European human rights
law); THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Philip Alston et al. eds., 1999) (examining the European Union's
human rights agenda).
30. See, e.g., Godinez-Cruz Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 5, ¶ 136 (Jan. 20, 1989)
(holding that Honduras had violated the Convention); VelAsquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July 29, 1988) (holding that Honduras had violated the Convention).
31. See Leonardo G. Filippini, Argentina, in VICTIMS UNSILENCED: THE INTER-AMERICAN
HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICA 71, 75 (M6nica Avila Paulette
& Catherine A. Sunshine eds., Gretta K. Siebentritt trans., 2007) ("This visit [by the Commission to
Argentina] had a significant impact on public opinion and helped consolidate some of the human rights
initiatives taking place inside the country.").
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principle of their new legal architecture, 32 and in the United States, human rights
advocates leveraged an obscure but powerful federal statute to hold individuals
responsible for human rights violations.33 At the beginning of the 1990s, the
United Nations determined that going forward, there should not be a separation
between civil and political rights on one hand, and economic and social riihts on
the other, as was enshrined in the two distinct covenants of the 1960s. 4 "All
human rights," the U.N. would now proclaim, "are universal, indivisible and
interdependent and interrelated."3 Such was the context when Professor Louis
Henkin famously wrote that we lived in "the age of rights." 36
B. The Inter-American Court's Influence on States
In its three decades of existence, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights-and, more generally, the regional inter-American human rights
regime-has exerted significant influence upon States.37 Both the Commission
and the Court have effectively put pressure on authoritarian regimes to cede
power. 38 For example, they have ordered States to amend their domestic law-
which in some cases resulted in changes to States' national constitutions39--to
32. See Cdsar Rodriguez-Garavito, Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact ofJudicial Activism on
Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America, 89 TEx. L. REv. 1669, 1671 (2011) ("I posit that this variety of
judicial activism, although particularly visible in the [Colombian Constitutional Court] jurisprudence, is
part of an emerging trend in Latin America and other regions of the global south. Embodied most clearly
by judicial intervention in structural cases that address widespread violations of socioeconomic rights,
this type of progressive neoconstitutionalism has unfolded with different names and features in different
parts of the global south.").
33. See COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN LATIN AMERICA (Rosalind Dixon & Tom
Ginsburg eds., 2017) (discussing the variety of constitutional experiences in Latin America and the
potential of constitutions as avenues of change); Beth Stephens, The Curious History of the Alien Tort
Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467, 1490 (2014) ("Human rights advocates lauded the statute as a
means to define and strengthen both the substance of human rights norms and their enforcement.").
34. The adoption of two separate Covenants in 1966 was due to States' inability to agree on a
single treaty containing all human rights obligations. At that time, the Cold War was well underway, and
the two political blocs-the United States and the Soviet Union, West and East-had sharply different
understandings of what a set of binding international human rights norms should look like.
35. World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme ofAction, T 5,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/23 (June 25, 1993).
36. 'Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990).
37. The Inter-American Court is comprised of seven judges, who are elected by the
Organization of American States General Assembly for a term of six years and may be reelected once.
Organization of American States [OAS], Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, art. 5(1),
Oct. 31, 1979, AG/Res. 448 (IX-0/79). The Court sits in San Jos6, Costa Rica. Id art. 3.1. Individuals
may not file complaints directly before the Court. Organization of American States, American Convention
on Human Rights art. 61.1, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. Instead, they must
petition the Inter-American Commission. Id. art. 33. If the Commission finds that a State has violated its
international obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights, it issues recommendations.
Id. art. 50.3; id art. 51.2. If a State is unable or unwilling to comply with the Commission's
recommendations, then the Commission takes the case before the Court. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights art. 45, 144th Reg. Period Sess. (Mar. 2013) [hereinafter
Commission Rules of Procedure]. Only then can individuals appear before the Court. Rules of Procedure
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights art. 25.1, 85th Reg. Period Sess. (Nov. 2009).
38. For a discussion on human rights in Latin America, see SONIA CARDENAS, HUMAN RIGHTS
IN LATIN AMERICA: A POLITICS OF TERROR AND HOPE (2010).
39. "The Last Temptation of Christ" Olmedo Bustos v. Chile (The Last Temptation of Christ),
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73 (Feb. 5, 2001).
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recognize certain collective rights for indigenous peoples,4 0 reform military
jurisdiction,41 legalize in vitro fertilization procedures,42 and recognize same-sex
43
marriage.
One of the areas in which the system has been most successful in
influencing state conduct is in the proscription of self-amnesty-laws. In a number
of decisions, the Commission and the Court have declared such laws to be
incompatible with States' obligations under the American Convention on Human
Rights.44 States have not just complied with those decisions; they have also
adopted the Inter-American Court's anti-amnesty doctrine from cases decided
against third States, under the belief that it is their legal obligation to do so.45
Latin American States' opinio juris, in other words, decisively shaped by the
Inter-American Court's case law, was that self-amnesty laws should be
prohibited.
In this section, I describe how States have used international human rights
law in domestic adjudication. Such influence is in tension (or at least must
coexist today) with the resisting attitude that States have developed-an attitude
that sometimes comes from the very States that were once friendly to the Court's
case law.
1. Domestic Adaptation ofInternational Law
By the end of the 1980s, several Latin American States were transitioning
from authoritarianism to democracy. As part of the transition to democracy,
46countries adopted new constitutions or amended their existing constitutions. A
key feature of this Latin American constitutional moment was States'
commitment to international human rights principles. Countries enshrined norms
that gave international human rights treaties constitutional rank. In a legal culture
where statutes are the main source of law, enshrining human rights law in
constitutions was an unequivocal message about States' commitment to abide by
international human rights law.47
40. The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 173.3 (Aug. 31, 2001).
41. Palamara-Iribarne v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 135, ¶ 269.14 (Sept. 23, 2005).
42. Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica (In Virto Fertilization), Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser C.) No. 257, ¶ 381.2 (Nov. 28, 2012).
43. Identidad de gdnero, e igualdad y no discriminaci6n a parejas del mismo sexo [Gender
Identity, and Equality and Non-Discrimination with Regard to Same-Sex Couples], Advisory Opinion
OC-24/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (set. A) No. 24, T 229.7 (Nov. 24, 2017).
44. See infra note 57.
45. See, for example, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court
of Justice], 14/06/2005, "Sim6n, Julio Hdctor y otros s/ privaci6n ilegitima de la libertad, etc." Fallos
(328:2056) (Arg.), and Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 13 diciembre 2006, "Calo
Molco," No. 559-2004 (Chile) (adopting the Inter-American Court's Barrios Altos anti-impunity
doctrine).
46. See, e.g., CONSTITUCI6N NACIONAL [CONTS. NAC.] (1994) (Arg.); CONSTITUCI6N
POLITtICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] (1989); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.]
(1991); CONSTITUICAO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] (1988) (Braz.); CONSTrruci6N POLITICA DEL
PER0 [C.P.] (1993).
47. See, e.g., M.C. MIROw, LATIN AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW AND
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But national courts also contributed to the expansion of human rights law.
Latin American constitutional courts began using inter-American human rights
jurisprudence in their local adjudication, albeit in non-uniform ways. In some
countries, like Colombia, courts established that international law and domestic
constitutional law form a single "block" of law to be applied by judges. 4 8 Hence,
when an individual files a case before a Colombian court, she can directly claim
that her human rights-as established both internationally and domestically-
have been violated. The Colombian Constitutional Court blurred all lines
between the international and the national planes and quickly became the most
progressive court in the region.49
In Argentina, after the 1994 constitutional reform that granted
constitutional status to international human rights treaties, the Supreme Court
embraced enhanced monism as an interpretative tool, giving direct application
to the American Convention on Human Rights.o In the leading Ekmekdjian case,
the Supreme Court of Argentina found that public international law imposes the
duty upon Argentinean organs to give primacy to an international treaty over a
national norm in case such norm is in conflict with the treaty.f' The supremacy
doctrine created by the Court became one of the key components of Argentina's
constitutional law.
Other tribunals, like Chile's Constitutional.Court, showed less enthusiasm
for the use of international norms, although the country's Supreme Court broke
ground when it gave direct application to the Geneva Conventions to allow the52
investigation of human rights violations despite the crimes being time-barred.
In one case, the Supreme Court-a mainly conservative tribunal-applied
international humanitarian treaties that the country had not even ratified, relying
on jus cogens arguments. Interviewed for this study, the current Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of Chile lamented that "there are people who still believe
that individual rights can be protected by domestic courts only. That is not
acceptable." 54 In another case, the Constitutional Court of Chile gave primacy to
INSTITUTIONS IN SPANISH AMERICA 237 (2004) (observing that formalism is one of the most important
factors determining Latin American attitudes towards law).
48. See MANUEL Jost CEPEDA ESPINOSA & DAVID LANDAU, COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: LEADING CASES 42-48 (2017).
49. See generally Manuel Iturralde, Access to Constitutional Justice in Colombia: Opportunities
and Challenges for Social and Political Change, in CONSTITUTIONALISM OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH: THE
ACTIVIST TRIBUNALS OF INDIA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND COLOMBIA 361 (Daniel Bonilla Maldonado ed.,
2013).
50. See Victor Bazin, El derecho internacional de los derechos humanos desde la dptica de la
Corte Suprema de Justicia de Argentina, 8 ESTUDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES 359, 368 (2010).
51. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
7/7/1992, "Ekmekdjian c. Sofovich / recurso extraordinario," Fallos (1992-315-1492) ¶ 19 (Arg.).
52. See Fernando Basch & Jorge Contesse, International Law and Domestic Adjudication, in
THE LATIN AMERICAN CASEBOOK: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND RIGHTS 248, 254 (Juan F. Gonzalez-
Bertomeu & Roberto Gargarella eds., 2016).
53. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 13 diciembre 2006, "Caso Molco," Rol
de la causa: 559-2004 ¶ 19 (Chile).
54. Interview with Chief Justice Haroldo Brito, Supreme Court of Chile, Santiago (Jan. 4,2018).
I personally conducted semi-structured interviews with judges from the Supreme Court of Chile, the
Constitutional Court of Chile, the Constitutional Court of Peru, and the Supreme Court of Argentina with
the goal of obtaining their opinions on the issues of resistance to and backlash against international human
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international human rights treaties, in particular the American Convention on
Human Rights, to find a "right to identity" not found in the domestic bill of
rights. 5 As noted by a justice from the Constitutional Court of Chile, litigants
routinely invoke human rights law as a way "to amplify the rhetoric" of their
pleas and arguments.56
2. The Anti-Impunity Doctrine
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has been more influential in
the context of addressing impunity. Since 2001, the Inter-American Court's case
law has found amnesty laws to be incompatible with States' obligations under
the American Convention on Human Rights to investigate, prosecute, and punish
those responsible for such violations. According to the Court, amnesty laws
may even render inapplicable some of the criminal law's most basic principles,
such as the prohibition of ex post facto laws and the res judicata principle.5
In its landmark decision Barrios Altos v. Peru, the Inter-American Court
found that Peru had international responsibility for the violation of the right to
life, the right to humane treatment, the right to a fair trial, and judicial protection
of fifteen individuals killed by a death squad that operated under the autocratic
regime of former Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori. 59 The Court declared that
amnesty laws "violate non-derogable rights recognized by international human
rights law,"6 0 further noting that such laws "lack legal effect." 61 As I have noted
elsewhere, the Court's pronouncement laid the ground for the Court's bold
rights law, as well as their views on the ways in which their courts interact with the inter-American human
rights system.
55. Tribunal Constitucional [T.C.] [Constitutional Court], 29 septiembre 2009, Rol de la causa:
1.340-09 (Chile).
56. Interview with Justice 1 of the Constitutional Court of Chile (Dec. 6, 2017) (name omitted
to preserve anonymity). The Justice also stated that his court in general views international human rights
law as "binding."
57. Massacre of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 252 T 283 (Oct. 25, 2012); Gelman v. Uruguay, Merits and
Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 221 ¶ 229 (Feb. 24, 2011); Gomes Lund
("Guerrilha do Araguaia") v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 219 ¶ 147 (Nov. 24, 2010); Almonacid Arellano v. Chile, Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154 1 110 (Sept.
26, 2006); La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. Hum. Rts. (ser. C)
No. 162 ¶ 187 (Nov. 29, 2006); Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
75, ¶ 41 (Mar. 14, 2001).
58. For a critique of the Court's doctrine on criminal law, see generally Ezequiel Malarino,
Judicial Activism, Punitivism and Supranationalisation: Illiberal and Antidemocratic Tendencies of the
Inter-American Court ofHuman Rights, 12 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 665 (2012) (criticizing the Court's recent
case law as deviating too far from the text of the American Convention on Human Rights).
59. The Court found that Peru was "responsible for failing to comply with Article 1(1)
(Obligation to Respect Rights) and Article 2 (Domestic Legal Effects) of the American Convention on}Iuman Rights as a result of the promulgation and application of Amnesty Laws No. 26479 and No.
26492." Barrios Altos, 2011 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 39.
60. Id. ¶41.
61. Id. ¶ 44. In his concurring opinion, Judge Sergio Garcia Ramfrez added, "[Tlhis
incompatibility signifies that those laws are null and void ... [and] determines the invalidity of the act,
which signifies that the said act cannot produce legal effects." Id. $ 15 (Garcia Ramirez, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
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assertion ofjurisdiction over StateS62 -an assertion ofjurisdiction that has today
come into question.6 3
Barrios Altos had a major impact on domestic judges. District courts issued
rulings ordering the reopeninE of criminal investigations in cases where courts
had applied the amnesty laws. And the Peruvian Constitutional Court embraced
the Inter-American Court's jurisprudence in its entirety, declaring that,
[T]he state's duty to investigate and punish those responsible for the violation of the
human rights declared in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights' decision [of
Barrios Altos] not only includes the annulment ofjudicial proceedings which applied
the amnesty laws . . . [i]t also encompasses any practice aimed at impeding the
investigation and punishment of those responsible of the violation of the right to life
and physical wellbeing .... 65
As noted by a current member of the Constitutional Court interviewed for
this study,
[S]ince Barrios Altos, under Peru's case law there is no separation between our law
and inter-American human rights law, or international law, in general. It is our duty
to use and apply international norms. If we don't do it, we could even be impeached.
That is how important international human rights law is for us.
The impact of the Barrios Altos decision, however, was not limited to
Peruvian courts. In 2005, the Argentinean Supreme Court overruled a 1987
decision and declared unconstitutional several of the country's amnesty laws.
The Court addressed the Law of National Pacification (1983), which granted
amnesty to members of the army involved in human rights violations, the Full
Stop Law (1986), which terminated all pending and future investigations for
human rights violations, and the Due Obedience Law (1987), which allowed
low-ranking officials to claim that they could not resist orders given by high-
ranking officials.68 The District Court held that Argentina's amnesty laws violate
international human rights law,6 9 and the Appellate Court, affirming the lower
62. Jorge Contesse, The International Authority ofthe Inter-American Court ofHuman Rights:
A Critique of the Conventionality Control Doctrine, 22 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 1168, 1172-74 (2018).
63. See infra Part V.C.
64. The Peruvian government requested an interpretation decision by the Inter-American Court
to determine whether the Barrios Altos decision applied only to that actual case or whether the holding
extended to other similar cases. In response, the Court said that the case's doctrine -that amnesty laws
are inapplicable-encompass all cases, not only the criminal investigations in Barrios Altos. See Case of
Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Interpretation of the Judgment of the Merits, Judgment Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 83 (Sep. 3, 2001).
65. Tribunal Constitucional del Per4 [Constitutional Court of Peru], Exp. No. 4587-2004-AA
/TC, Santiago Enrique Martin Rivas (Nov. 29, 2005) T 63 (emphasis added).
66. Interview with Judge Eloy Espinosa Saldafia, Constitutional Court of Peru, Lima (Aug. 30,
2017).
67. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
14/06/2005, "Sim6n, Julio Hdctor y otros s/ privaci6n ilegitima de la libertad, etc." Fallos (328:2056)
(Arg.), overruling Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
22/06/1987, "Camps, Ram6n Juan Alberto y otros," Fallos (310:1162) (Arg.).
68. For a detailed analysis of the politics of the Argentinean transitional justice, see ANNELEN
MIcus, THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM AS A SAFEGUARD FOR JUSTICE IN NATIONAL
TRANSITIONS: FROM AMNESTY LAWS TO ACCOUNTABILITY IN ARGENTINA, CHILE AND PERU (2015). For
an analysis of the Siman decision, see Christina A.E. Bakker, A Full Stop to Amnesty in Argentina: The
Simdn Case, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1106 (2005).
69. Juzgado Nacional en lo Criminal y Correccional Federal No. 4, "Fallo Siman." The decision
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court's ruling, included the doctrine from Barrios Altos in its decision.70 Then,
the Supreme Court relied on Barrios Altos7 1 and a report by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, which recommended the adoption of all
necessary measures to determine the identity of those responsible for the human
rights violations.7 2
The Argentinean Court found that the Inter-American Court's decision in
the Barrios Altos case addressed all questions about State obligations under
international anti-impunity doctrines.73 The Argentinean Court cited the Inter-
American Court's holding at length before declaring that that decision must
govern the present case, thus rendering Argentina's amnesty laws null and
void.7 4 Along with other constitutional courts in the region, Argentina's Supreme
Court embraced international human rights law and, in particular, the decisions
by the Inter-American Court, whether against Argentina or other States. Inter-
American human rights law was to be considered part of the law of Latin
American States.
III. THE DECLINE OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW?
In recent years, it has become more and more common to hear that
international law is going through difficult times. To be sure, both States and
non-State actors continue to engage in international law-making-through the
adoption of treaties, soft-law instruments, judicial decisions, and international
lobbying. Yet over the past decade, talk about pushback, resistance and backlash
against international law has intensified. The project of international law,
commentators observe, is living in "turbulent times."75
Human rights law has been particularly affected by the broader pushback
against international law. Against the rosy narrative of international law and
human rights law as a moral mechanism that brings the world together, scholars
are increasingly noticing the ways in which States defy international law-
whether by refusing to comply with judicial decisions handed down by
discussed the development of international criminal law generally, but did not use the Inter-American
Court's case law.
70. See MICUS, supra note 68, at 238 (describing Cdmara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo
Criminal y Correccional Federal, Sala 11, "Incidente de apelacidn de Simdn, Julio," Decision of
November 9, 2001, Case No. 17.899).
71. "Sim6n, Julio Hdctor y Otros," at T 23.
72. Id. T 20 (citing Consuelo Herrera v. Argentina, Judgments, Cases 10.147, 10.181, 10.420,
10.262, 10.309 & 10.311, Inter-Am. Comm'n. H.R. Report No. 28 (1992)).
73. Id. T 23.
74. Simon was a step further in a political process that began years earlier. In 2003, the
Argentinean Congress had declared that both amnesty laws were null and void ab initio, along the lines
of the Barrios Altos doctrine. When the Supreme Court handed down Siman, it was thus confirming the
legislature's decision not just to repeal, but in fact to annul, such legislation. The effects of such annulment
were that all those who had benefited from the amnesty could not invoke the prohibition of retroactivity
of penal laws and the principle of res judicata, and could now be tried. Id ¶ 31.
75. See Monica Hakimi, International Law in "Turbulent Times," Part I, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 6,
2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/international-law-in-turbulent-times-part-i/.
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international courts, or by exiting treaties. 7 Scholars urge international courts
to be "resilien[t]." 78 More broadly, the challenge to international law seems to
be linked to the attack on Western values, such as liberal democracy and human
rights, as exemplified by the surge of illiberal regimes in Europe, the election of
Donald Trump in the United States, and events such as Brexit. Scholars
associated with the global constitutionalist school in fact ask whether it is the
very existence of "the West" that is at risk.
Human rights have come under attack, both in the United States and
elsewhere. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights' seventieth
anniversary in December 2018 comes at a crucial time as States recede from their
human rights obligations. Exploring States' forms of resistance to these
obligations may inform the direction that human rights, and international law
more generally, may take. One thing is certain: because of the instability of
States' commitment to their international obligations, we should no longer take
for granted the universal moral project that was set up seven decades ago.
To better understand the under-studied matter of States' resistance to the
inter-American human rights system, it may be useful to consider the discussion
in the broader context of pushback against other human rights and international
law regimes. The remainder of this Section briefly describes instances of
resistance outside of the inter-American context: (1) in the European human
rights system, and (2) in Africa, regarding the International Criminal Court and
the pushback against the young African Court on Human and People's Rights.
A. European Backlash
In 2005, the European Court of Human Rights handed down a decision,
Hirst v. United Kingdom, in which it found that the country's blanket ban on
prisoners' right to vote violated the European Convention. The European Court
faced an unprecedented backlash from the U.K. tabloid media and politicians.
76. Andreas Zimmermann, Times Are Changing-and What About the International Rule of
Law Then?, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/times-are-changing-and-what-about-
the-international-rule-of-law-then/.
77. See Laurence Helfer, Treaty Exit and Intra-Branch Conflict at the Interface ofInternational
and Domestic Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (Curtis A.
Bradley ed., 2019).
78. Consider two panels organized by the Max Planck Institute on Comparative Public Law and
International Law at the 2018 ICON-S Annual Conference in Hong Kong, on "The Authoritarian
Pushback and the Resilience of International Institutions." See also Ximena Soley & Silvia Steininger,
Parting Ways or Lashing Back?: Withdrawals, Backlash and the Inter-American Court ofHuman Rights,
14 INT'L J.L. CONTEXT 237, 253-55 (2018) (offering ways for the Inter-American Court to be resilient in
the face of growing backlash by States).
79. See M. Kumm, J. Havercroft et al., The End of "the West" and the Future of Global
Constitutionalism, 6 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 1 (2017).
80. See Sarah Margon, Giving Up the High Ground: America's Retreat on Human Rights, 97
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 39,40 (Mar.-Apr. 2018) ("[T]he United States has walked away from ... a number of
vital global commitments, institutions, and initiatives that would provide an opportunity to share the
burden of combating global challenges while respecting rights.").
81. See Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), App. No. 74025/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. IM 40, 42 (2005)
(Grand Chamber). See also Merris Amos, The Dialogue Between United Kingdom Courts and the
European Court ofHuman Rights, 61 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 557 (2012); Ed Bates, Analysing the Prisoner
Voting Saga and the British Challenge to Strasbourg, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 503 (2014).
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Then-Home Secretary Theresa May went as far as to say the U.K. should leave
the European Convention of Human Rights.82 Hirst not only marked the first
salient case of backlash against an international human rights court, but it was
also notable in that the backlash came from a nation that both was a decisive
contributor to the formation of a European human rights regime and is a well-
functioning parliamentary democracy.
The European Court has responded to Hirst in various ways, mainly by
granting more deference to States through the use of the margin of appreciation
doctrine. However, despite the more favorable position the European Court has
taken towards the country, the standoff is not over. The extent of the impact that
the negative sentiment towards "Europe," sparked by decisions by the European
Court of Human Rights, had on the U.K.'s Brexit vote of 2016 has yet to be
determined. U.K. pushback has led to larger political efforts on the part of
European States to contain the European Court of Human Rights. This is
exemplified by the adoption of several High Level Declarations that stress that
the role of the Court should remain that of a subsidiary tribunal, and that the
Court should grant a wide margin of appreciation to domestic States. 84
A more recent example of resistance towards the European human rights
regime comes from Russia, also involving restrictions to prisoners' right to vote.
In 2013, the European Court addressed Russia's blanket prohibition on
prisoners' electoral right and found the country in violation of the European
Convention on Human Rights.85 Unlike the case of the U.K., however, Russia's
ban stems directly from its constitution, not a parliamentary act. Thus, in order
to comply with the European Court's judgment, Russia would have had to amend
its national constitution. However, in July 2015, the Russian Constitutional
Court issued a groundbreaking decision, finding that judgments by the European
87Court that contradict the Russian Constitution could not be executed. Then, in
December of that same year, the Russian Parliament passed a law formally
granting the Russian Constitutional Court the power to review the decisions of
the European Court of Human Rights and to declare such judgments "non-
executable" if they violate Russia's constitution. This unprecedented defiance
82. Charlie Cooper, Theresa May Says UK Should Leave European Human Rights Convention,
THE INDEPENDENT (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/european-
convention-human-rights-eu-referendum-brexit-theresa-may-a6999701.html.
83. See Eirik Bjorge, National Supreme Courts and the Development ofECHR Rights, 9 INT'L
J. CONST. L. 5,17 (2011); Madsen, supra note 14, at 171 (2016).
84. See Oddny Mjill Arnard6ttir, The Brighton Aftermath and the Changing Role of the
European Court ofHuman Rights, 9 J. INT'L DIsp. SETTLEMENT 223 (2018).
85. Anchugov & Gladkov v. Russian Federation, App. Nos. 11157/04 & 15162/05, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2013).
86. Article 32(3) of the Russian Constitution states, "Deprived of the right to elect and be elected
shall be citizens recognized by court as legally unfit, as well as citizens kept in places of confinement by
a court sentence." KONSTiTUTSllA ROSSISKOI FEDERASTII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 32(3)
(Russ.). See Marina Aksenova, Ancugov and Gladkov is Not Enforceable: The Russian Constitutional
Court Opines in its First ECtHR Implementation Case, OPINIOJURIS (Apr. 25, 2016).
87. Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 14 ijulja 2015 g. [Ruling of
the Russian Federation Constitutional Court of Jul. 14, 2015], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL'STVA
ROSSISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation], No. 21-II/2015, Jul. 14,
2015.
88. Alexandra Sims, Vladimir Putin Signs Law Allowing Russia to Ignore International Human
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took shape in April 2016, when the Russian Court used its newly granted power
and declared that the European Court's judgment in Anchugov and Gladkov v.
Russia could not be executed. Commentators have expressed concern that
Russia's challenge to European human rights decisions may have larger
implications for the system in general as it struggles to retain its legitimacy.
B. The "Africa Question"
In January 2017, African countries announced their intention to leave en
masse the International Criminal Court.91 The sentiment among African nations
was-and, to a large extent, still is-that the International Criminal Court, based
in The Hague, unjustly focuses on issues occurring in African States,92 an issue
that even current members of the Court have had to acknowledge. 93 The first
countries to announce their intention to withdraw from the Rome Statute (the
treaty that created the International Criminal Court) were South Africa and
Burundi. The former eventually decided not to withdraw; the latter, however, did
withdraw from the treaty, thus becoming the first country to exit the Rome
Statute.94
In the context of regional human rights, the African Union established a
regional Court on Human and People's Rights, which, like the European and
Inter-American courts, exerts both advisory and contentious jurisdiction.95 The
Court is just one of five regional courts with competence to address human rights
issues.96 However, despite its young age, it is already facing resistance from
States.97 Along with the unresolved tensions between the African Union and the
Rights Rulings, THE INDEPENDENT (Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
europe/vladimir-putin-signs-law-allowing-russian-court-to-overthrow-interational-human-rights-
rulings-a6773581.html.
89. PostanovIenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 19 aprelia 2016 g. [Ruling
of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court of Apr. 19,2016], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] May
5, 2016, https://rg.rul2016/05/05/sud-dok.html [https://perma.cc/X2S2-RGCT].
90. Rachel M. Fleig-Goldstein, Note, The Russian Constitutional Court versus the European
Court ofHuman Rights: How the Strasbourg Court ShouldRespond to Russia's Refusal to Execute ECtHR
Judgments, 56 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 172 (2017).
91. Afican Leaders Plan Mass Withdrawalfrom International Criminal Court, THE GUARDIAN
(Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/jan/31/african-leaders-plan-mass-withdrawal-
from-international-criminal-court.
92. See Kurt Mills & Alan Bloomfield, African Resistance to the International Criminal Court:
Halting the Advance oftheAnti-Impunity Norm, 44 REV. INT'L STUD. 101 (2017); Mandiaye Niang, Africa
and the Legitimacy of the ICC in Question, 17 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 615 (2017). Cf Margaret deGuzman,
Is the ICC Targeting Afiica Inappropriately?, ICC FORUM (Mar. 17, 2013),
*http://iccforum.com/africa#deguzman ("This small number of decisions provides an insufficient basis to
conclude that the ICC is discriminating in its selection practices.").
93. "It is important for the future that the ICC is able to demonstrate that it is not exclusively
focused on Africa." Bertram Schmitt, ICC Judge Schmitt Counsels Resilience to Preserve International
Justice, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/62577/icc-judge-schmitt-counsels-
resilience-preserve-international-justice/.
94. Jina Moore, Burundi Quits International Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/27/world/africa/burundi-international-criminal-court.html.
95. See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of
an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (Jun. 9, 1998).
96. See Daniel Abebe, Does International Human Rights Law in African Court Make a
Diference?, 56 VA. J. INT'L L. 527 (2016).
97. See Tom Daly & Micha Wiebusch, The Afican Court on Human and Peoples' Rights:
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International Criminal Court, international tribunals are wrestling to obtain
African States' compliance with their international obligations. Pushback and
resistance is occurring in Africa as well.
IV. RESISTANCE COMES TO THE AMERICAS
The influence of the Inter-American Court's case law upon States
identified in Part II has led some legal scholars to believe that there is a "common
Latin American law," a sort of regional corpus juris that binds all States, for
which the Inter-American Court is the ultimate interpreter.98 Others view it as a
"new-constitutionalist" turn-where the international protection of fundamental
rights has become the lingua franca of domestic constitutional law.99 Regardless,
Latin American constitutional courts use international law, and in particular,
international human rights law, as part of the legal material to be applied in all
constitutional disputes. 100
In recent years, however, the Court's attempts to establish itself as the
ultimate authoritative legal voice in the Americas and to hold States accountable
has resulted in pushback from some States. In some cases, States' resistance to
the inter-American system is hardly defensible. In other cases, however, States'
discontent needs to be examined more carefully, as it raises plausible questions
about the scope of international authority. In fact, current judges from Latin
America's highest courts express skepticism towards some of the Inter-
American Court's legal doctrines, even though they generally acknowledge that
States should be members of a regional regime of human rights protection. 101
In this sense, some States' actions may be oriented toward actually
improving the system, while others may be aimed at undermining it. As I show
below, Latin American States have engaged in reform talks to adjust the
mechanisms and procedures of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights.102 However, while some States participated in such processes in good
faith to make reforms that would improve the Commission's performance, others
took part in, and even led, the process with the goal of undermining the
Commission. All States were engaged in the same reform process, yet their
motivations did not necessarily coincide. Similarly, when a domestic court issues
a decision that challenges the international court's assertion of powers,103 that
decision may be construed as an action of resistance aimed at either improving
the human rights system (or, more specifically, the international court's
legitimacy vis-A-vis domestic authorities), or undermining the international
Mapping Resistance Against a Young Court, 14 INT'L J. LAW IN CONTEXT 294 (2018).
98. See Armin von Bogdandy et al., lus Constitutionale Commune en Amdrica Latina: A
Regional Approach to Transformative Constitutionalism, in TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
LATIN AMERICA: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW IUS COMMUNE (A. von Bogdandy et al. eds, 2017).
99. See generally NECONSTITUCIONALISMO(S) (Miguel Carbonell, comp. 2005).
100. Alexandra Huneeus, Introduction to Symposium on the Constitutionalization of
International Law in Latin America, 109 AJIL UNBOUND 89, 89-90 (2015).
101. See infra Part IV (discussing interviews with judges from Peru's Constitutional Court and
Chile's Supreme Court).
102. See infra Part IV.B.
103. See infra Part IV.C.
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court's position. The decision by the Supreme Court of Argentina that I discuss
below is a fine example of this phenomenon. Distinguishing between the two
forms of engagement will be useful to better understand the reforms that I
propose in Part V, as their ultimate goal is to enhance the human rights system,
not to undermine it.
In this Section, I discuss different instances of resistance and reform,
grouping them as (a) frontal backlash against the inter-American system, (b)
covert resistance, and (c) judicial pushback.
A. Frontal Backlash
For years, legal scholars, human rights advocates and officials in the
Americas have expressed concern that there is a need for all Organization of
American States (OAS) Member States to ratify all inter-American human rights
instruments-the so-called "universalization" goal. In the context of inter-
American human rights law, the term is used to signal "universal ratification of
all inter-American instruments" by most-hopefully all-Organization of
American States members.104 Regional human rights bodies consider
universalization "a necessary step toward full protection of human rights within
the region."10 5 Among the thirty-five OAS members, twenty-five have ratified
the American Convention,106 making almost all Latin American States parties to
the main human rights regional treaty, which establishes and gives jurisdiction
to the Inter-American Court.
One of the biggest challenges to universalization is, of course, some States'
unwillingness to ratify the American Convention (and other regional human
rights treaties). With the United States and Canada as the prime example of such
107States, many efforts on universalization are directed to attract those countries
to the treaty regime. Yet, universalization faces another, arguably greater,
challenge, one that comes from States that express their discomfort with the
system by taking the most radical action-denunciation. Because such decisions
are usually accompanied by strong criticism against the treaty regime when a
State exits, a State's withdrawal can cause harm to the system's overall stability.
Understanding the practice of treaty exit, therefore, is a necessary step to
addressing the problems of resistance against international human rights law.
I will now discuss instances in which States have attempted to withdraw
from the Inter-American Court's jurisdiction without denouncing the treaty
("partial exit"), as well as cases where States have fully exited ("full exit").
104. Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Considerations Related to the Universal Ratification of the
American Convention and other Inter-American Human Rights Treaties, OAS/Ser.L/V/II.152, doc. 21 ¶ 4
(2014).
105. Id.
106. Two States, however, have denounced the convention.
107. U.S. President Jimmy Carter signed the American Convention in 1978, and although the
Senate considered the matter back then, it has not taken subsequent action to ratify the treaty. Canada has
not signed the American Convention, despite calls from official bodies and civil society to do so. See
Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights, Enhancing Canada's Role in the OAS:
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1. Partial Exit
Peru ratified the American Convention on Human Rights in 1978 and, at
that time, it also recognized the Court's contentious jurisdiction. However, in
1999, in response to the Court's order that Peru annul domestic convictions and
overturn domestic law, the government attempted to withdraw from the Inter-
American Court's jurisdiction under a theory that it could do so without fully
denouncing the American Convention on Human Rights. os At issue was a 1999
decision in which the Court found Peru responsible for the violation of the rights
of a university professor tried by military tribunals under charges of terrorist
crimes.1 09 The Court ordered Peru to annul the judgment and to amend the
constitutional and legal norms that granted military courts jurisdiction over non-
military individuals. Two years later, in a similar case of terrorist acts-but this
time against four Chilean nationals charged with being members of the terrorist
group Tupac Amaru-the Court again found against Peru.1 0 As in Loayza
Tamayo, the Court found that military trials, in particular the use of "faceless"
judges, violated the right to due process under the American Convention,"' that
Peru must annul the convictions, and that the government repeal the legal rules
under which the four individuals were tried."12
The Peruvian Executive, led by the authoritarian Alberto Fujimori, reacted
to the Court's decision by asking Congress to declare that the country would no
longer be subject to the Inter-American Court's jurisdiction." 3 The Inter-
American Court's ruling ordering Peru to overturn domestic law was the perfect
reason Fujimori needed to directly challenge the Court's authority.1 4 Fujimori
had used the struggle against terrorism as a successful platform to keep his
authoritarian rule. The Court's decision in Loayza Tamayo, where the convicted
108. See Ariel Dulitzky, El retiro del reconocimiento de la competencia contenciosa de la Corte
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos por parte de Perii: Andlisis Juridico, 6 PENSAMIENTO
CONSTITUCIONAL 705,708 (1999). Article 78 of the American Convention establishes how States can exit
the treaty:
"1. The States Parties may denounce this Convention at the expiration of a five-year period
from the date of its entry into force and by means of notice given one year in advance. Notice
of the denunciation shall be addressed to the Secretary General of the Organization, who shall
inform the other States Parties.
2. Such a denunciation shall not have the effect of releasing the State Party concerned from the
obligations contained in this Convention with respect to any act that may constitute a violation
of those obligations and that has been taken by that state prior to the effective date of
denunciation." American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 78.
109. Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 33 (Sept. 17,
1997).
110. Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 52 (May 30, 1999).
111. Id.¶¶221-22.
112. Id.1226.
113. Like other international treaties, the American Convention on Human Rights states that once
a country decides to denounce the treaty, there is a one-year latency period. The purpose of these types of
norms is to impede States seeking to avoid their international obligations by the unilateral act of
denouncing the treaty.
114. Douglass Cassel, El Per se retira de la Corte: ,afrontard el reto elsistema interamericano
dederechos humanos?, 29 REVISTAINSTITUTO INTERAMERICANODEDERECHOSHUMANOS 69,71(1999)
(translated by author).
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was a Peruvian university professor, was not enough of an excuse to impugn the
inter-American human rights system's intromission in Peru's national security.
However, an international judgment ordering the State to conduct a new trial
against four aliens charged with terrorism was enough.
Peruvian courts were the first to react. Less than two weeks after the Inter-
American Court's decision in Loayza, the Criminal Chamber of the Military
Jurisdiction's Supreme Council declared the Inter-American Court's judgment
to be "non-executable."' 1 5  Similarly, the Military Jurisdiction Supreme
Council's Grand Chamber denounced the Inter-American Court's decision in
Castillo as "lacking impartiality and violating the Peruvian Constitution."H1 6
Hence, the domestic court reasoned, the international decision could not be
implemented.
With the support of the Military Jurisdiction's Supreme Council,
Fujimori's ambassador to the OAS sent a letter to the Organization's Secretary
General, informing him that Peru considered the Inter-American Court's orders
to amend domestic legislation "simply unacceptable"' 1 7 and that it was
"impossible to accept" the Court's decisions.' 18 On the national plane, Fujimori
turned to Congress, requesting the approval of a Legislative Resolution arguing
for Peru's withdrawal from the Inter-American Court's contentious
jurisdiction1 l 9 with immediate effect. 12 0 Following a 14-hour debate, the
Fujimori-controlled Congress approved the Executive's motion.12 1 Members of
Congress resorted to the rhetoric of national security and terrorism: one decried
the Inter-American Court's decisions as "demanding to sacrifice the rights of
more than 25 million Peruvians for the rights of a few." 12 2
The same day, the Peruvian government submitted an instrument "wherein
it advised that it was withdrawing its declaration consenting to the optional
clause in the American Convention recognizing the contentious jurisdiction of
the Court."' 2 3 The decision by the Peruvian government was received with
criticism by human rights organizations, the U.S. government,124 the
International Bar Association,' 25 and, of course, inter-American human rights
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 72.
118. Id.
119. Upon request of the Organization of American States -and member States, the Inter-
American Court may also exert advisory jurisdiction, to issue non-binding opinions on issues pertaining
to the interpretation of the rights established in the American Convention and other regional treaties. See
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 64.
120. E-mail from Jorge Bustamante Romero, former Minister of Justice of Peru, to Josd Luis
Sard6n, former Dean of the School of Law of the Universidad Peruana de Ciencias Aplicadas (Feb. 16,
2012, 12:30 PET) (on file with author).
121. Legislative Resolution No. 27152, July 8, 1999.
122. Perd aprobd su retiro de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, EL DIA (La Plata),
July 9, 1999, http://www.eldia.com/nota/1999-7-9-peru-aprobo-su-retiro-de-la-corte-interamericana-de-
derechos-humanos (translated by author).
123. Iveher-Bronstein v. Peru, Jurisdiction, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 54, ¶ 28
(Sept. 24, 1999).
124. US. Faults Peru for Quitting Latin Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1999, at A5.
125. Peru's Withdrawalfrom the Jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court, August 1999, INT'L
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bodies. The President of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
lamented Peru's decision, declaring that it was "illegal" insofar as the text of the
American Convention does not contemplate the possibility of a State
withdrawing from the Court's contentious jurisdiction; it only contemplates a
full denunciation of the treaty. 126 However, neither the OAS Permanent Council
nor its Secretary General stood up for the Court and the inter-American human
rights system. C6sar Gaviria, the OAS Secretary General, expressed his support
for the inter-American system but stopped short of criticizing Peru, noting that
he highly respected Peru's effective policy against terrorism, despite the Inter-
American Court's and Commission's pronouncement condemning Peru's
actions to combat terrorism.1 27
Finally, the Inter-American Court reacted by issuing, on the same day, two
decisions on its competence regarding two pending cases against Peru.128 In both
cases, the Court found that Peru's purported withdrawal was "inadmissible"
under the law of treaties.129 The Court advanced two arguments. First, it declared
that an interpretation of the American Convention made "'in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in light of its object and purpose"' led the Court to the unequivocal
conclusion that the only way a State may disengage from its obligations under
the treaty is by fully denouncing it.1 30 Second, the Court observed that even if
"release" were possible, it could never take effect immediately, as Peru had
argued.131 The Court considered that the Vienna Convention requires a State
party that wishes to exit a treaty to give "not less than twelve months' notice of
its intention to denounce or withdraw from a treaty."' 32 In an exercise of its own
BAR ASSOC., http://www.ibanet.org/HumanRights Institute/AbouttheHRI/HRIActivities/HRI
Media/HRIInterventions/archive/000899_Peru.aspx ("The IBA is concerned that the decision not to
recognise the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court as binding deprives Peruvian citizens of their right
to appeal to a supranational court guaranteed by Article 205 of Peri's 1993 Constitution ... Perl's action
will seriously undermine the Inter-American system for the protection and promotion of human rights.")
(last visited Apr. 18, 2019).
126. Perti aprobd su retiro de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, supra note 122.
127. Cassel, supra note 114, at 74.
128. The first case concerned the Israeli-born, naturalized Peruvian partial owner ofa TV station,
whose citizenship was revoked by the government after a sham investigation allegedly revealed that there
was no evidence that he had renounced his Israeli citizenship. Government officials had requested him to
change his editorial stance after the station aired reports of torture committed by members of the Peruvian
Army's Intelligence Service and corruption accusations against an Intelligence Service advisor. Ivcher-
Bronstein, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 54, ¶ 2(d). Mr. Ivcher unsuccessfully sought relief before
Peruvian courts, the government revoked his Peruvian citizenship, and a judge handed over management
of the company to the other shareholders. Id. ¶T 2(h)-(I). The second case concerned the congressional
decision to impeach three members of the Constitutional Court who declared that a law allowing President
Fujimori to run for another term in 2000 violated the 1993 Constitution. Constitutional Court v. Peru,
Jurisdiction, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 55 (Sept. 24, 1999).
129. Ivcher-Bronstein, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 54,154; Constitutional Court, 1999
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 55, ¶ 53.
130. Ivcher-Bronstein, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 54,1 40 (quoting Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331); Constitutional Court, 1999 Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 55, ¶ 39.
131. Ivcher-Bronstein, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 54,¶ 52; Constitutional Court, 1999
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 55, ¶ 51.
132. Iveher-Bronstein, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 54, ¶ 52 (citing Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, supra note 128, art. 56(2)). The Court's holding is inconsistent with the text of
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powers to determine its own jurisdiction-what the Court called the
"compdtence de la compdtence" or "Kompetenz-Kompetenz" 1-the regional
tribunal found that it was still competent and would therefore continue with the
proceedings against Peru.1 34
Despite the Court's response to Peru's exit, the country did not amend its
decision. It was only in 2001, after Alberto Fujimori stepped down from office
and the country initiated its path to rebuild democratic institutions, that the newly
elected authorities reinstated Peru's recognition of the Court's contentious
jurisdiction,'3 5 thereby adopting a collaborative attitude towards the inter-
American organs.1 36 This process suggests that Peru's resistance was directly
connected to both the ruling by an autocrat and the political context that made
Fujimori possible.
States may also seek to partially exit a treaty without having to engage in
a direct challenge like Peru's 1999 challenge. One such case is the partial exit
(presumably) effected through a 2014 decision by the Constitutional Court of the
Dominican Republic.1 37 In its judgment, the Court found that the Instrument of
Recognition of the Inter-American Court's jurisdiction, signed by the President
of the Dominican Republic in February 1999, was unconstitutional, as Congress
had not approved it. The Court's decision came only a few weeks after the Inter-
American Court notified the Dominican Republic of its judgment against the
country on the sensitive issue of the right to citizenship of individuals of Haitian
descent born in the Dominican Republic, in which it demanded that the country
amend its national constitution. 3 8
The ruling was not the first one by the Inter-American Court on the matter.
In 2005, the Court had found the State responsible for violating the rights to
citizenship of two children of Haitian descent born in the country,' 39 ordering the
Dominican Republic government to recognize the nationality of the two
petitioners and to adopt all necessary measures "to regulate the procedure and
the Vienna Convention, which provides a default rule for the case of a treaty that contains "no provision
regarding its termination and which does not provide for termination or withdrawal." Id. art. 56(1)
(emphasis added). Because Article 78(1) of the American Convention does provide for denunciation (or
"withdrawal"), the Vienna Convention's default rule does not apply in this case-the Court should have
referred to Article 78(1) of the American Convention instead. Constitutional Court, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 55, ¶ 51.
133. Ivcher-Bronstein, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) Np. 54, ¶ 32; Constitutional Court, 1999
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 55, ¶ 31.
134. Ivcher-Bronstein, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 54, ¶ 56; Constitutional Court, 1999
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 55, ¶ 55.
135. Perdt vuelve a reconocer jurisdiccidn de Corte Interamericana de OEA, EL MERCURIO
(Santiago), Jan. 31, 2001, http://www.emol.com/noticias/internacional/2001/01/31/44847/peru-vuelve-a-
reconocer-jurisdiccion-de-corte-interamercana-de-oea.html.
136. Less than a month later, Peruvian officials met with the Inter-American Commission to
propose settlement agreements in more than 150 pending petitions before the Commission. See Inter-Am.
Comm'n Hum. Rts., Comunicado de prensa conjunto [Joint Press Release] (Feb. 22, 2001),
http://www.cidh.org/Comunicados/Spanish/2001/PERU.htm.
137. Tribunal Constitucional [Constitutional Court], 4 noviembre 2014, Sentencia TC/0256/14
[Judgment TC/0256/14], http://www.tribunalconstitucional.gob.do/content/sentencia-tc02561 4 .
138. Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 282 (Aug. 28, 2014).
139. Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 130 (Sept. 8, 2005).
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requirements for acquiring Dominican nationality based on late declaration of
birth."1 40 The country did not comply with the decision. Furthermore,
conservative politicians pushed to amend the constitution in the opposite
direction as required by the Inter-American Court, seeking to enshrine norms
that would deny citizenship to Dominican-born individuals of Haitian descent. 14 1
In 2010, the campaign ended up with the adoption of a new constitution that
established a critical exception to the jus soli principle: Dominican-born children
of immigrants "illegally" residing
in the State would not be granted Dominican citizenship.1 4 2
Furthermore, three years later, the Constitutional Court dramatically
expanded this newly enactedjus soli principle. Dominican authorities had seized
a Haitian Dominican woman's birth certificate, and refused to grant her a
Dominican identification card. The woman challenged the authorities' decision
before the Constitutional Court, and the Court issued an unprecedented decision,
establishing that the new constitutional norm on jus soli must be applied
retroactively, going back to 1929.143 The Dominican Constitutional Court's
decision rendered "tens of thousands of Dominican-born people of Haitian
descent effectively stateless."l 4 4
In response, the Inter-American Court addressed the 2013 Dominican
court's decision in its August 2014 judgment.1 4 5 As previously discussed, the
Inter-American Court demanded that the State amend its national constitution to
bring it in line with the country's international obligations under the American
Convention on Human Rights.1 4 6 Though the challenge against the Instrument
140. Id. ¶239.
141. According to two U.S. law professors who represented the petitioners before the Court, "a
small group of racist, ultranationalist politicians orchestrated an aggressive campaign against the ruling."
Roxanna Altholz & Laurel E. Fletcher, Opinion, The Dominican Republic Must Stop Expulsions of
Haitians, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2015, http://nyti.ms/1KIJtrZ.
142. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPf BLICA DOMINICANA [CONSTITUTION], 13 junio 2015, art. 18(3)
(Dom. Rep.) (excluding persons born in the national territory to foreigners that find themselves in transit
or reside illegally in Dominican territory from Dominican nationality).
143. Tribunal Constitucional [Constitutional Court], 23 septiembre 2013, Sentencia TC/0168/13
(Judgment TC/0168/13], at 99, http://presidencia.gob.do/themes/custom/presidency/docs/gobplan/
gobplan-15/Sentencia-TC-0168-13-C.pdf. In 1929, a constitutional amendment established the exception
to Dominican citizenship for the "children of foreigners who find themselves in transit" Id. at 51-52.
Since 1929, all constitutional reforms have affirmed the same norm: in 1934, 1942, 1947, 1955, 1959,
1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1966, 1994, 2002, 2010 and 2015. Consultoria Juridica del Poder Ejecutivo
[CJPE] [Legal Consultancy of the Executive Power], Coleccidn de constituiciones [Collection of
Constitutions], http://www.consultoria.gov.do/Services/Constitutions.
144. Editorial, Stateless in the Dominican Republic, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2015,
https://nyti.ms/lCvVkZe. Facing international criticism, the Dominican government established a process
that was supposed to offer a path to citizenship to individuals affected by the Constitutional Tribunal
decision. However, "the application process was so onerous and poorly administered" that individuals
could not realistically seek remedy to their precarious immigration status-or lack of status, for that
matter. Id. See also Ernesto Sagds, Report on Citizenship Law: Dominican Republic, GLOBAL
CITIZENSHIP OBSERVATORY 9-10 (2017), http://cadmus.eui.euibitstream/handle/1814/50045/RSCAS
GLOBALCITCR2017_16.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (discussing Naturalization Law 169-14
that attempted to grant residency to some of those affected by the 2013 ruling by the Constitutional
Tribunal).
145. See Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 282 (Aug. 28, 2014).
146. The Court ordered the State to adopt measures for the registration and generation of identity
documents for the victims, to allow one of the victims with Haitian origin to reside in Dominican territory,
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of Ratification had been pending since 2005-with the Dominican court
seemingly uninterested in moving forward with the case-the 2014 judgment by
the Inter-American Court prompted the Dominican court to quickly turn its
attention to the challenge against the Instrument of Recognition to decide
whether or not the country's acceptance of the Inter-American Court's
jurisdiction was a constitutional violation. The Dominican court did find a breach
of domestic constitutional law: just as the president needs congressional approval
for the State to become a party to the American Cohvention, the Court reasoned,
he must also seek congressional approval to recognize the Court's jurisdiction.1 4 7
The court established that the executive's will to subject the country to
international obligations requires the participation of other government bodies
as a check on the power of each branch, with the ultimate goal of protecting the
fundamental principle of constitutional supremacy." 4 8 The Court relied on
previous practice, in particular the country's acceptance of the jurisdiction of the
Permanent Court of International Justice,149 and on the practice of other Latin
American States.150 Since Congress passed a resolution to approve the
recognition of jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the
Dominican court reasoned that the acceptance of jurisdiction for the Inter-
American Court must follow the same procedure. 5 1
The Dominican court dismissed two arguments that advocates and
constitutional lawyers put forward to oppose the challenge against the
Dominican Republic's recognition of the Inter-American Court's jurisdiction.
An amicus brief submitted by the Latin American Council of International and
Comparative Law Scholars argued that the Court could not declare the
Instrument of Recognition ofjurisdiction invalid without violating the principles
of estoppel andforum prorogatum.152 In public international law, the doctrine of
estoppel "protects legitimate expectations of States induced by the conduct of
another State."' 53 In this situation, of course, the matter does not involve a
dispute between States, but between an international court and a member State.
More specifically, the matter involves the question of whether a State can be
estopped from denying the international court's jurisdiction.1 54 The brief
and to adopt legislative measures (including constitutional measures) to ensure to every newborn in the
territory of the Dominican Republic an accessible and simple birth registration. Id. 512.
147. Tribunal Constitucional [Constitutional Court], 4 noviembre 2014, Sentencia TC/0256/14
[Judgment TC/0256/14], http://www.tribunalconstitucional.gob.do/content/sentencia-tcO 2 561 4 ¶ 9.18.
148. Id.
149. Id. ¶ 5.2(C)(d).
150. Id T 9.20 (citing Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], noviembre 10, 2009,
Sentencia C-801/09 (Colom.)).
151. Id.
152. Brief for Latin American Council of International and Comparative Law Scholars as Amici
Curiae, Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 4 noviembre 2014, Sentencia TC/0256/14
¶ 5.2(B) (Dom. Rep.).
153. Thomas Cottier & Jdrg Paul Milller, Estoppel, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007). On the origins and application of the international doctrine of estoppel, see
Megan L. Wagner, Jurisdiction by Estoppel in the International Court of.Justice, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1777
(1986).
154. See Jack Wass, Jurisdiction by Estoppel and Acquiescence in International Courts and
Tribunals, 86 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 155, 158 (2016) (arguing that there is
"significant support in both doctrine and case law for [the application of estoppel and acquiescence] to
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observed that, between the Dominican Republic's ratification of the American
Convention in 1977 and the submission of the Instrument of Recognition of the
Court's jurisdiction in 1999, the country did not make any declarations or
reservations regarding the Inter-American Court's competence.' 55 Nor did the
country make reservations during the more than fifteen years that elapsed
between the submission of the Instrument of Recognition and the challenge
against said Instrument.156 Hence, the brief argued, the Dominican Republic was
effectively estopped from denying jurisdiction to the Inter-American Court
through the Dominican court's decision.
The principle offorum prorogatum can be characterized as a manifestation
of estoppel in the specific context of jurisdiction. Pursuant to the doctrine of
forum prorogatum, a State that has not consented to the jurisdiction of an
international treaty but that agrees to take part in proceedings after it has been
instituted may not challenge that court's jurisdiction.157 In the specific context of
the Dominican case, theforum prorogatum argument seems to be even stronger
as the State-or at least its highest authority-had expressly manifested its
intention to recognize the Inter-American Court's contentious jurisdiction. The
Dominican court countered these arguments by simply noting that State officials
representing the country in proceedings before the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights had acted upon a "presumption of legality" for the Instrument of
Recognition of the Court's jurisdiction. 1s The Dominican court notably
observed that the challenge against the Instrument of Recognition was, however,
"a factor that could rebut the Instrument's presumption of legality."' 59
The Dominican court's ruling caused an immediate reaction by the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights.' 60 Human rights leaders and advocates
denounced the ruling as "shameful" and "without effect on the international
plane."161 By declaring the Instrument of Recognition of the Court's jurisdiction
unconstitutional, the Dominican tribunal put the country on the path to partially
exiting the American Convention. Since the Dominican court's decision, the
Inter-American Court has not decided a contentious case against the country, but
only two requests for provisional measures. In the first case, which was decided
ten days after the Dominican court's ruling, the Court granted provisional
measures, but the second request for provisional measures, in a case involving
the question ofjurisdiction").
155. Corte Constitucional, 2014 Sentencia TC/0256/14 (Dom. Rep.), ¶ B(e).
156. Id.
157. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania), Preliminary Objections, 1948 I.C.J. Rep. 15, 27
(Mar. 25).
158. Corte Constitucional, 2014 Sentencia TC/0256/14 (Dom. Rep.), ¶ 9.9.
159. Id.
160. The Commission observed that the Dominican court's decision had "no basis whatsoever in
international law, and therefore it [could] have no effect." Inter-Am. Comm'n Hum Rts., IACHR
Condemns Judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Dominican Republic, Press Release No. 130/14
(Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media-center/preleases/2014/130.asp.
161. Santiago Cant6n, former Executive Secretary of the Inter-American Commission,
commented: "the Dominican Republic's court shows its total ignorance and lack of adherence to basic
principles of international law. With their discriminatory decisions, they are Latin America's
embarrassment." Silvia Ayuso, La Repdblica Dominicana se desliga de la Corte Interamericana de
DDHH, EL PAiS (Nov. 5, 2014) (translated by author).
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death threats against Haitian nationals, was rejected in February 2016.162 Also,
in a reaction to the decision, the Inter-American Commission included the
Dominican Republic in Chapter IV of the Commission's 2017 Annual Report,
the so-called "blacklist" of countries that violate human rights, 163 causing
Dominican leaders to react vehemently. Former president Leonel Ferndndez,
who signed the impugned Instrument of Recognition of jurisdiction in 1999,
published a scathing article against the Inter-American Commission, accusing
the Commission of "[launching] a new attack against the Dominican Republic
using erroneous arguments, deploying fallacious concepts, and displaying a
worrying bias that could continue to erode its already diminished credibility
amongst OAS member States."164
The Dominican case presents more complexities than the previously
discussed attempted (partial) exit by Peru. First, the pushback in the Dominican
case did not come from an authoritarian State, but rather from a democratic one.
Second, the act of resistance in the Dominican case was a decision by the
country's highest court-an act that the executive may not challenge without
creating a separation of powers issue, as has happened in other cases.165 In fact,
the Court did not directly address the question of the Inter-American Court's
international jurisdiction; the Dominican court's analysis was circumscribed to
the domestic implications of the President's actions without congressional
approval. To be sure, by declaring the Instrument of Recognition
unconstitutional, its direct effect was the questioning of the Inter-American
Court's jurisdiction over the country. But despite its weaknesses, the Dominican
court's decision raises an important question: whether the assertion of
jurisdiction of an international court is a domestic or an international matter-or
both. The Inter-American Court seems to believe that the issue is governed by
international law, 166 and that "events extraneous to [the Court's] own actions"
cannot affect the Court's jurisdiction.167 But municipal law evidently plays a role
162. Juan Almonte Herrera v. Dominican Republic, Provisional Measures, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Nov. 13, 2015) (granted); Nadege Dorzema v. Dominican Republic, Provisional Measures, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Feb. 23, 2016) (denied).
163. The Inter-American Commission uses four criteria to list States in Chapter IV of its Annual
Report: 1) serious breach of fundamental elements and institutions provided by the Inter-American
Democratic Charter; 2) the illegitimate suspension of constitutional guarantees through the declaration of
a state of emergency or siege; 3) the commission of massive, serious, and widespread human rights
violations; and 4) the presence of structural situations that seriously affect the enjoyment and use of said
fundamental rights. Chapter IV of the Commission's Annual Report became one of the most contentious
issues of the two-year process that States conducted to review the Commission's powers under the
American Convention. See infra Part III.B.
164. Leonel Fernndez, The IACHR Strikes Again, GLOB. FOuND. DEMOCRACY & DEv. (Aug. 5,
2017), http://www.globalfoundationdd.org/fulltext.asp?t-a&id=9561 (observing that the Commission's
report "constitutes a genuine interference in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic" and "a great
legal blunder revealing a colossal disregard of history and a malevolent political intent").
165. See infra Part IV.C.
166. The Court has stated that the "acceptance [of jurisdiction] is determined and shaped by the
treaty itself and, in particular, through fulfillment of its object and purpose." Constitutional Court v. Peru,
Jurisdiction, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 55, ¶ 48 (Sept. 24, 1999).
167. Id. ¶ 33. In a revealing passage from his academic writings, former judge Antonio Cangado
TrindAde (a current member of the International Court of Justice) proclaimed: "The [Inter-
American] Court, and not the State, has the last word on its jurisdiction-the opposite would lead to the
subversion of the international legal order and to the destruction of all legal certainty in international
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in determining how States exit a treaty.' States may perceive the Court's
position as too aggressive, leaving no room for domestic constitutional
regulations to determine fundamental issues such as jurisdiction.
2. Full Exit
A more radical measure to express discontent with an international court
or the regime that a court oversees is to fully exit such regime. In the last years,
countries have withdrawn from several international treaties, prompting scholars
and international judges to pay increased attention to such developments.169 So
far, two States from the Americas have withdrawn from the American
Convention on Human Rights: Trinidad & Tobago and Venezuela.
In 1998, following multiple battles with international human rights
tribunals and the London-based Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,1 70
Trinidad & Tobago became the first Member State of the Organization of
American States to denounce the Convention. The discord began when, in
response to the increase of violent criminality, Trinidad & Tobago and other
Caribbean nations put an end to the moratoria for the death penalty established
in the late 1970s. Although public opinion and legal elites were largely
supportive of the countries' use of death penalty, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, along with other international human rights
bodies (such as the United Nations Human Rights Committee), issued a number
of recommendations against the use of the death penalty that provoked the
country's ultimate decision to abandon the treaty regime.
During the 1980s and early 1990s, in response to the imposition of death
penalty convictions, many individuals filed petitions before human rights bodies
and the Caribbean countries' highest appellate court: the United Kingdom-based
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.1 7 2 The latter court's role in the death
dispute resolutions." ANToNIO CAN$ADO TRINDADE, Las cldusulas pdtreas de la proteccidn
internacional del ser humano: El acceso directo de los individuos a lajusticia a nivel internacional y la
intangibilidad de lajurisdiccidn obligatoria de los tribunales internacionales de derechos humanos [The
eternity clauses of the international protection of the human being: The direct access of individuals to
justice at the international level and the inviolability of the compulsory jurisdiction of international human
rights courts], in I EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE PROTECCI6N DE LOS DERECHOs HUMANOS EN EL
UMBRAL DEL SIGLO XXI 41 (2003) (translated by the author).
168. James Crawford, The Current Political Discourse Concerning International Law, 81 MOD.
L. REV. 1, 12 (2018) ("Domestic law provisions will also be relevant for withdrawal, and here the role of
domestic courts is of particular importance.").
169. Crawford, a leading scholar of international law and a judge on the International Court of
Justice, has recently observed that "allowing the possibility of withdrawal by including express clauses in
treaties may be the price of getting States to consent to be bound in the first place." Id. at 22. See also
Laurence R. Helfer, Introduction to Symposium on Treaty Exit at the Interface of Domestic and
International Law, 111 AJIL UNBOUND 425 (2017-2018). On the particular case of Latin America, see
Alexandra Huneeus & Rend Uruefla, Treaty Exit and Latin America's Constitutional Courts, 111 AJIL
UNBOUND 456 (2017-2018).
170. For an account of Trinidad & Tobago's (and other Caribbean nations') confrontation with
the Privy Council, see Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory
and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832,
1860-82 (2002).
171. Id. at 1868 ("Contrary to a trend in other parts of the world, Commonwealth Caribbean
nations had never abolished the death penalty.")
172. Trinidad & Tobago had ratified the American Convention on Human Rights, thus accepting
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row cases is critical to explain Trinidad & Tobago's decision to denounce the
American Convention. In a 1993 decision against Jamaica,1 73 the Privy Council
found that the prolonged time that inmates were on death row was a form of
inhuman and degrading treatment which violated both constitutional norms and
international treaties, 174 and declared that inmates on death row could not wait
for more than five years between their sentences and their executions.1 75 The
court also found that using judicial recourses to prolong the wait time could not
be attributable to the inmates but to the faulty judicial system.' 76 The decision
caused Jamaica-and other Caribbean nations- to commute the death sentences
of more than a hundred prisoners who had been on death row for over five years.
The Privy Council's decision established that the review of death penalty
cases carried out by international bodies would take less than eighteen months. 7 7
It noted that the U.N. Human Rights Committee would not act as "a further
appellate court" that reviews the facts and the evidence submitted to the jury, and
therefore individuals would have "no grounds . . . to make a complaint based
upon delay." 78 However, the Council was mistaken. As Helfer notes, "only in
1999 did review times [before the Inter-American Commission] decrease below
the Privy Council's eighteen-month estimate."' 79 Furthermore, complainants
were allowed to petition both the Human Rights Committee and the Inter-
American Commission. Hence, review times added up, causing post-conviction
reviews to exceed the five-year limit that Pratt had set. By lodging petitions
before both international bodies, inmates could effectively delay their
executions, forcing Caribbean countries to commute their death sentences,'so
resulting in "a near de facto abolition of the death penalty."' 8 1
Officials and the general public were unhappy with the situation. Trinidad
& Tobago's Attorney General stated that the Human Rights Committee's delay
the Inter-American Court's jurisdiction, in 1991. Previously, the country had ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1978 and the Covenant's Optional Protocol in 1980.
By accepting the Inter-American Court's contentious jurisdiction and ratifying the ICCPR's Optional
Protocol, citizens of Trinidad & Tobago had international avenues to seek for redress whenever the
country failed to protect citizens' fundamental rights.
173. Pratt v. Att'y Gen. for Jamaica [1994] 2 AC 1 (PC) (appeal taken from
Jam.).
174. In the words of the court: "To execute these men now after holding them in custody in an
agony of suspense for so many years would be inhuman punishment within the meaning of section 17(1)





179. Helfer, supra note 170, at 1877. As for the U.N. Human Rights Committee, the review time
lasted between forty-four and fifty-six months before the ruling in Pratt. After the Privy Council's
decision, review times generally decreased, but only in one year (1997) did they fall below the eighteen-
month estimate. Id at 1875-77.
180. See Glenn McGrory, Reservations of Virtue? Lessons from Trinidad and Tobago's
Reservations to the First Optional Protocol, 23 HuM. RTS. Q. 769, 777-78 (2001).
181. Helfer, supra note 170, at 1879. See also Jane E. Cross, A Matter of Discretion: The De
Facto Abolition of the Mandatory Death Penalty in Barbados-A Study of the Boyce and Joseph Cases,
46 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 39, 58-59 (2014) (arguing that international obligations have served to
constrain the actions of the Barbados Privy Council, resulting in a de facto repeal of the mandatory death
penalty in Barbados).
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in reviewing claims by death row inmates had "facilitated persons convicted of
murder to escape the death penalty."l 82 In a remarkable move, the Caribbean
States issued "instructions" to the two international human rights bodies with the
aim of expediting death sentence examinations.183 Unsurprisingly, the U.N.
Committee rejected the attempt to unilaterally impose timetables on a human
rights body.1 8
On 26 May 1998, the government of Trinidad & Tobago finally decided to
withdraw its ratification of the American Convention on Human Rights. As a
result of the country's treaty exit, after May 26, 1999, the Inter-American Court
could no longer hear cases brought by Trinidadian nationals.186 Only the
Commission would thereafter be permitted to hear cases from, and issue
recommendations against, Trinidad & Tobago. 87
More recently, Venezuela followed suit. After several years of direct
accusations against both the Inter-American Court and the Commission for lack
of impartiality, and following the denunciation of other international treaties,'ss
Venezuela announced its decision to withdraw from the American Convention
in September 2012.189 Unlike the case of Trinidad & Tobago, Venezuela's full
182. Helfer, supra note 170, at 1880 n.199.
183. Id. at 1880.
184. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm. Jamaica, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.83, ¶ 11 (Nov. 19, 1997) ("The Committee considers that the Governor-General's
notification of 7 August 1997, unilaterally imposing timetables for the examination of communications
under the Optional Protocol by the Committee, cannot be invoked as justification for any measure that
would deviate from the Covenant, the Optional Protocol, or requests by the Committee for interim
measures of protection.").
185. In his letter to the OAS Secretary General, Trinidad & Tobago's Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Ralph Maraj, stated that his government could not "allow the inability of the [Inter-American]
Commission to deal with applications in respect of capital cases expeditiously to frustrate the
implementation of the lawful penalty for the crime of murder in Trinidad and Tobago." Trinidad and
Tobago: Notice to Denounce the American Convention on Human Rights, Letter from Ralph Maraj to
Cdsar Gaviria Trujillo, Secretary General, Organization of American States (May 26, 1998),
https://www.oas.org/dil/treaties b-32_americanconvention on humanrightssign.htm#Trinidad%20
and%20Tobago. On the same date (May 26, 1998), Trinidad & Tobago withdrew its ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' Optional Protocol. See Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights n.1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Some scholars
posit Trinidad & Tobago's denunciation of the American Convention as the first instance of backlash in
the context of the inter-American human rights system. See Wayne Sandholtz, Yining Bei & Kayla
Caldwell, Backlash and International Human Rights Courts, in CONTRACTING HUMAN RIGHTS: CRISIS,
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND OPPORTUNITY 159, 162-3 (Alison Brysk & Michael Stohl eds., 2017).
186. Pursuant to Article 78 of the Convention, the denunciation takes effect only one year after
a State submits the instrument of withdrawal. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 8, art.
78.
187. See Natasha Parassram Concepcion, The Legal Implications of Trinidad & Tobago's
Withdrawalfrom the American Convention on Human Rights, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 847, 854 (2001).
188. In 2012, Venezuela also denounced the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention). See Sergey Ripinsky,
Venezuela's Withdrawal From ICSID: What it Does and Does Not Achieve, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS
(Apr. 13, 2012), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/venezuelas-withdrawal-from-icsid-what-it-does-
and-does-not-achieve/.
189. Notice of Denunciation, Minister of Popular Power for Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela, Letter from Nicolas Maduro Moros to Jos6 Miguel Insulza, Secretary General,
Organization of American States at 11 (Sep. 6, 2012), http://www.oas.or/DIL/Nota_
Repiiblica BolivarianaVenezuela toSG.English.pdf) [hereinafter Notice of Denunciation]. Venezuela
expressly stated its intention to also withdraw from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights'
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exit came at a particularly difficult time for the inter-American system, as several
States had successfully pushed for a reform process of the Inter-American
Commission that debilitated much of the system's strength.190 The denunciation
also came at a difficult time for the country itself At the time, Venezuela was
going through a political crisis. The situation has since dramatically deteriorated,
reaching what human rights organizations see as a "humanitarian crisis"l 91 with
systematic human rights violations.1 92
In its Notice of Denunciation, then-Minister of Foreign Affairs and current
President Nicolds Maduro explained the country's radical decision, denouncing
the inter-American human rights bodies' "perverted practices"' 93 and "flagrant
[and] systematic"' 94 violations of the American Convention, and asserting that
Venezuela was "in the vanguard of rights-based systems in the region." 9 5
Maduro criticized the OAS human rights bodies for becoming "a political
weapon aimed at undermining the stability of specific governments . . .
[interfering] in the internal affairs of our government, violating ... the principle
of respect for state sovereignty and the principle of self-determination of peoples
11196
. .. In the same communication, he praised the United Nations' Human
Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review mechanism as based on
"constructive dialogue under conditions of equality, compatibility, respect, and
justice,"1 97 despite legal scholars' increasing questioning of the Human Rights
Council as a politicized mechanism for human rights protection.198
Unlike Peru's and Trinidad & Tobago's submissions to withdraw from the
American Convention, Venezuela's Notice of Denunciation included an
appendix containing a detailed explanation of its decision. The country offered
competence. Id. The country ratified the Convention in 1977 and recognized the competence of the Inter-
American Court in 1981. Id. at 1.
190. See infra IV.B.
191. See, e.g., Venezuela's Humanitarian Crisis, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 24, 2016)
("Venezuela is experiencing a profound humanitarian crisis.").
192. Press Release, U.N. Off. of the High Commissioner of H.R., Venezuela: Human Rights
Violations Indicate 'Policy to Repress,' (Aug. 30, 2017), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/News
Events/Pages/DisplayNews.aspxNewslD=22007&LangID=E. The economic and social situation in the
country is so precarious that children literally die of hunger, despite the country having "the largest proven
oil reserves in the world." See Nicholas Casey, Dying Infants and No Medicine: Inside Venezuela's Failing
Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2016), https://nyti.ms/1V3SFNG; Meridith Kohut and Isayen Herrera,
As Venezuela Collapses, Children Are Dying of Hunger, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2kDINOS.
193. Notice of Denunciation, supra note 189, at 11.
194. Id. at 5.
195. Id. at 2.
196. Id.at3.
197. Id. at 4.
198. See Wuerth, supra note 9, at 313 (noting that "the Human Rights Council, like the Human
Rights Commission before it, is of questionable value . . . ."); see also Gayatri Patel, Smoke and Mirrors
at the United Nations' Universal Periodic Review Process, 10 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. IN HEALTHCARE 310
(2017) (calling the Universal Periodic Review mechanism "superficial in nature"); Mie Roesdahl,
Universal Periodic Review and its Limited Change Potential: Tracking the Complexity ofMultiple Actors
and Approaches to Human Rights Change Through the Lens ofthe UPR Process ofNepal, 9 J. HUM RTS.
PRACTICE 401 (2017). But see Rochelle Terman & Erik Voeten, The Relational Politics of Shame:
Evidence from the Universal Periodic Review, 13 REv. INT'L ORGS. 1 (2018) (arguing that "selective and
politicized" interactions between States can affect positively States' compliance with human rights
norms).
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three sets of reasons for its denunciation: first, the alleged lack of impartiality of
the Inter-American Commission;' second, the fact that cases were submitted
by the Commission to the Court in violation of the rule of prior exhaustion of
domestic remedies;200 and finally, a number of reasons based on the interaction
between Venezuela's constitutional law and the country's international human
rights obligations, as articulated by the Venezuelan Supreme Court.
2 0 1
B. Covert Resistance
Among the reasons Venezuela gave for denouncing the American
Convention was an unprecedented event in the history of the inter-American
system: a two-year process led by the Organization of American States'
Permanent Council in which the Inter-American Commission, States, and civil
society organizations addressed the need for reforming the Inter-American
Commission.
The Commission is not a judicial body; rather, it issues recommendations.
If States fail to follow those recommendations, the Commission may submit a
petition to the Inter-American Court, since, unlike in the European human rights
system, individuals in the Americas may not submit complaints directly to the
Inter-American Court. The Commission also conducts country visits,202 issues
precautionary measures,2 03 publishes annual reports on the state of human rights
in the region to be presented to the OAS General Assembly,204 and publishes
thematic reports on different human rights matters.205 The Commission's
jurisdiction stems from the Charter of the Organization of American States,2 0 6
199. Specifically, Venezuela denounced the Commission's "[p]artiality and lack of precision" in
including certain countries in the Commission's annual report on grave human rights violations; the
Commission's interference with domestic legislative processes; the lack of criteria for the Commission's
timing of proceedings; the lack of precision regarding precautionary measures and individual petitions;
the Commission's "[d]iscretion and laxness in reinterpreting its mandates and rules"; the "conspirational
negligence" of the Commission's Executive Secretary in response to the thwarted coup d'6tat of April
2002; and the "impossibility of making necessary reforms" to the inter-American human rights system.
Notice of Denunciation, supra note 189, at 15-19.
200. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 37, art. 46.1(a), 1144 U.N.T.S. at
155 (prohibiting the Commission from admitting a petition or communication unless "the remedies under
domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of
international law").
201. See Notice of Denunciation, supra note 189, at 3, 5.
202. See Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 37, ch. IV.
203. See Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 37, art. 25.
204. See Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 37, art. 59.
205. See Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 37, art. 58. The Commission has published
reports on a wide range of topics, such as poverty and human rights; rights of indigenous peoples; pretrial
detention; freedom of expression; human mobility; violence against LGBTI persons; gender equality; the
right to truth; the death penalty; sexual violence; indicators on economic, social and cultural rights; and
terrorism and human rights.
206. See Charter of the Organization of American States art. 106, Apr. 30, 1948, 48 U.N.T.S
1609 ("There shall be an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, whose principal function shall
be to promote the observance and protection of human rights and to serve as a consultative organ of the
Organization in these matters. An inter-American convention on human rights shall determine the
structure, competence, and procedure of this Commission, as well as those of other organs responsible for
these matters.").
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the American Convention on Human RightS2 07 and the American Declaration on
the Rights and Duties of Man 208-an international instrument that predated the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights by months. 20 9
In June 2011, "with the aim of strengthening the inter-American human
rights system,"210 the OAS Permanent Council established a Special Working
Group to make recommendations. Multiple rounds of conversations, academic
conferences, and diplomatic meetings took place between 2011 and 2013.211 As
a leading human rights activist observes, the process kept human rights defenders
in the Americas "on tenterhooks for nearly two years." 2 12 The consultation
process, which resulted in the adoption of a new set of rules of procedure for the
Commission, was a direct response to States' discomfort with the
Commission's handling of certain matters-particularly, the Commission's
expansive use of precautionary measures, the absence of clear guidelines for the
admissibility of petitions against States, and the lack of guidelines for the
inclusion of certain States under Chapter IV of the Commission's Annual Report,
known as the "black list" of countries that violate human rights in a systematic
manner.214 Former OAS officials candidly observe that, when the process began,
the environment was one "of mistrust between the member States and the
Commission." 2 15 That environment did not change significantly, and though the
process ended with both the Commission and States praising the many
agreements they reached, such agreements came at the expense of a painfully
detailed set of regulations imposed on the Commission. By forcing the
Commission to adopt new rules and regulations with specific and detailed
guidelines, States effectively demonstrated that they retained the power to guide,
207. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 37, ch. VII, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 153.
208. See Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 37, art. 51 ("The Commission shall receive
and examine any petition that contains a denunciation of alleged violations of the human rights set forth
in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in relation to the Member States of the
Organization that are not parties to the American Convention on Human Rights.").
209. See G.A. Res. 217 (1I) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
210. OAS Permanent Council, Rep. ofthe Special Working Group to Reflect on the Workings of
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with a View to Strengthening the Inter-American
Human Rights System, OEA/Ser.G, CP/doc.4675/12, at 1 (Jan. 25, 2012).
211. The Permanent Council held fifteen regular and special sessions and the Inter-American
Commission devoted thirty-seven meetings to the issue. Five regional forums were held, with more than
150 speakers from civil society and representatives from 32 States and States, non-governmental
organizations, academics, and individuals submitted position papers
(more than one hundred and fifty in total). See J. Jesfts Orozco, The Process ofStrengthening the Inter-
American Human Rights System, 19 APORTES DPLF 4 (2014).
212. Katya Salazar, Between Reality and Appearances, 19 APORTES DPLF 16 (2014).
213. Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 37.
214. See Gabriela Kletzel, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights' New Strategic
Plan: An Opportunity for True Strengthening, 22 INT'L J. HUM. RTs. 1249 (2018). The term "black list"
("lista negra") is used colloquially by media outlets to refer to the annual report's designation. See, e.g.,
Sergio G6mez Maseri, Colombia ingresd de nuevo a la 'lista negra' de la Comisidn Interamericana de
Derechos Humanos [Colombia re-entered the 'blacklist' of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights], EL TIEMPO (Apr. 15, 2010), https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS- 7 601167.
215. Hugo de Zela, The Process of Strengthening the Inter-American Human Rights System, 19
APORTES DPLF 9, 10 (2014). De Zela, then Chief of Staff of the General Secretariat of the OAS, further
notes that the lack of dialogue between States and the Commission "resulted in a significant degree of
misunderstanding on both sides, frequently marked by mistrust and misconceptions of the reasons behind
some actions." Id. at 9.
2092019]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
if not control, many of the Commission's powers. The "strengthening process"
has amounted to a covert pushback by the States under diplomatic guise, even if
some of its results-such as the requirement that the Commission pay more
attention to how it justifies its recommendations-have been reasonable.
Sustained resistance may not be intended to undermine a system but could
be part of a healthy process to improve it. Something of this sort could happen
with judicial challenges to the Inter-American Court's decisions, as I show in the
next Section. To be sure, some States may have participated in the strengthening
process with a sincere belief that it was necessary to effect changes in order to
improve the Commission's work. Just as domestic lawmakers push for changes
to domestic policy when they see that current regulations are not sound or need
to be updated, so do States when international norms and regulations need to be
216
reformed. However, when other interests drive the push for change, the
attempt to alter the regulations-or, in the present case, the inter-American
system-may not be bona fide efforts to enhance the system but rather a covert
attempt to weaken it.
The process discussed in this Section was significantly an effort not to
improve the system, but rather to undermine it, despite the friendly rhetoric that
accompanied it. To determine whether instances of resistance are part of a
concealed effort to weaken an international institution, one must look at the
motivations that underlie the reform processes (why do States want to bring
about change?), the public statements and the general rhetoric that States'
representatives use (what are the problems or challenges that States identify?),
and the ultimate results of such processes (how is the international institution
affected by the reform process?). These are some of the questions that guide the
analysis that follows, where I show that the efforts to reform the Commission-
and, more generally, the system-were essentially instances of resistance with
the (covert) aim of undermining it.
International human rights bodies routinely issue precautionary measures,
also called "interim" or "provisional" measures.217 Under the Inter-American
Commission's Rules of Procedure, the Commission may adopt precautionary
measures whenever there are "serious and urgent situations" presenting a risk of
"irreparable harm to persons or to the subject matter of a pending petition or case
216. States have attempted to reform the inter-American human rights system several times. The
distinctive feature of the 2011-2013 process, as noted by a former chairman of the Inter-American
Commission, was that States pushed to take over the reform process-something that had not occurred
before. See Felipe GonzAlez Morales, El proceso de reformas recientes al Sistema Interamericano de
Derechos Humanos [The process of recent reforms to the Inter-American Human Rights System], 59
REVISTA INSTITUTO INTERAMERICANO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 119, 121 (2014).
217. The International Court of Justice exercises its legal authority to issue precautionary
measures as well. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 41, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
33 U.N.T.S. 993 ("The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require,
any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.").
Human rights bodies that use precautionary measures include: the U.N. Committee Against Torture; the
U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women; the Human Rights Committee;
the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination; the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; and the Committee on Enforced
Disappearances.
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before the organs of the inter-American system." 2 18 Human rights activists and
commentators widely praise the Commission's rich case law on precautionary
measures, 2 19 but leading up to the June 2011 "strengthening process," States
were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the Commission's use of
precautionary measures for at least two reasons. First, some States directly
challenged the Inter-American Commission's assertion of "implied powers" to
issue precautionary measures, largely because the American Convention does
not grant the Commission such power. Second, even some of the States that did
not impugn the Commission's precautionary jurisdiction nonetheless expressed
concern for what they saw as an illegitimate expansion of the jurisdiction. In
Sections 1 and 2 below, I address the two reasons advanced by States. In Section
3, I summarize States' latest efforts to reform the system.
1. Implied Powers
The American Convention on Human Rights gives power to the Court, not
the Commission, to issue "provisional measures." The Commission's power to
issue precautionary measures is not within the enumerated functions listed in
220Article 41 of the Convention, nor is it in the Commission's Statute. The Statute
grants the Commission the power to make recommendations "on the adoption of
progressive measures in favor of human rights . . . as well as appropriate
,,221
measures to further observance of those rights, and to request that the Inter-
American Court take provisional measures in urgent cases not yet submitted for
consideration by the Court.222 As previously discussed, the Commission's power
to issue interim measures is found in the Commission's Rules of Procedure
adopted by the Commission itself.
According to the Commission, its authority to grant precautionary
measures with a binding character rests on "the general duty of the States to
respect and guarantee human rights, to adopt the legislative or other measures
necessary for ensuring effective observance of human rights, and to carry out in
good faith the obligations contracted under the American Convention and the
Charter of the OAS."223 The Commission's justification is vague at best,
especially given the fact that neither the American Convention nor the Charter
of the OAS mention the Commission's power to grant urgent measures.
Moreover, such a power hardly follows from States' "general duty" to respect
218. Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Rules of Procedure, art. 25 (2011).
219. Regional human rights mechanisms, such as the European Court of Human Rights and the
African Commission on Human and People's Rights, also issue interim measures. In some cases, human
rights bodies use precautionary measures to protect other rights, such as freedom of expression, due
process, and property. See generally Jo M. Pasqualucci, Interim Measures in International Human Rights:
Evolution and Harmonization, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (2005).
220. OAS, Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, O.A.S. Res. 447 (IX-
0/79), OEA/Ser.P./IX.0.2/80 (1979).
221. Id. art. 18(b) (emphasis added).
222. Id. art. 19(c).
223. Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the
Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124, doc. 5 rev. 1, ¶ 241 (Mar. 7, 2006), http://www.cidh.org/countryrep
/Defenders/defenderstoc.htm.
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human rights and to adopt "legislative or other measures." In fact, when the OAS
General Assembly did want to grant such a power to a human rights body, it
expressly stated it in the text of the American Convention.224 In a formalistic
legal culture such as Latin America's, a body that asserts a power not expressly
enumerated in its constituent instrument must provide strong reasons to support
such assertion of power.225 The Commission, in this case, failed to do so.
However, the main criticism levied against the Commission's self-asserted
power to issue precautionary measures has not come from Latin American
countries but from the United States. U.S. human rights advocates have asked
for precautionary measures in a number of cases, including challenges to
22627detention and deportation, the death penalty,227 the rights of persons detained
in Guantanamo Bay,228 and the rights of Sioux tribes opposing the construction
of the Dakota Access Pipeline.229 These advocates observe that "[p]recautionary
measures are not binding on the United States and U.S. compliance is generally
low."230 More interestingly, although the U.S. government-at least until
2017-actively participated in hearings convened by the Inter-American
Commission and responded to requests for precautionary measures,231 its
responses to the Commission have routinely pointed out the Commission's "lack
of jurisdiction to issue precautionary measures." 232 More recently, other States
224. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 63(2).
225. On Latin America's legal formalism, see, generally, Jorge L. Esquirol, Writing the Law of
Latin America, 40 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 693, 695 (2008-2009); Jorge L. Esquirol, The Turn to Legal
Interpretation in Latin America, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1031 (2011).
226. See, e.g., Haitian Refugees v. United States, Case 10.675, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report
No. 28/93, OEA/Ser.LN.85, doc. 9 rev. (1993); Nyamanhindi v. United States, PM 149/08, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.134, doc. 5 rev. 1, ch. III , $ 36 (2008); Wayne Smith v. United States,
Case 12.562, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 81.10 (2010).
227. See, e.g., Beazley v. United States, Case 12.412, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
101/03, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2 (2003); Bucklew v. United States, PM 177/14, Petition 684-
14, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R. (2014); Kevin Cooper v. United States, PM 160/11, Petition 593-11, Inter-
Am. Comm'n H.R. (2011); Jos6 Ernesto Medellin v. United States, Case 12.644, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,
Report No. 90-09 (2006).
228. See, e.g., Detainees being held by the United States at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba v. United
States, Petition 259/02, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R. (2002).
229. Cymie Payne, Standing Rock goes to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
INTLAWGRRLS (Dec. 3, 2016), https://ilg2.org/2016/12/03/standing-rock-goes-to-the-inter-american-
commission-on-human-rights/.
230. Human Rights Institute, Columbia Law School, Human Rights in the United States: Primer
on Recommendations from the Inter-American Human Rights Commission & the United Nations, at 14
(Jun. 2015), http://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-institute/files/
primer. june 2015.for cle.pdf.
231. For example, in its 2014 Digest of United States Practice in International Law, the year after
the strengthening process had concluded, the U.S. government proclaimed to be "firmly committed to
supporting an Organization that values accountability to its member States and transparency in its
operating procedures." The government stated: "We look forward to working with other member States
to consolidate this process . . . and transform the OAS into a more vibrant and efficient institution that
supports the core values of its founding Charter, representative democracy, the exercise of human rights,
security for those most vulnerable and sustainable development for all." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DIGEST OF
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 7, § E(1) at 303 (2014).
232. See, e.g., U.S. Additional Response to the request for precautionary measures, Detainees
being held by the United States at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Petition 259/02, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R. (July
15, 2002), https://www.state.gov/s/1/38642.htm. In response to a 2015 precautionary measures request,
the U.S. noted: "While the Commission's arrogation of such a power is perhaps understandable, it is not
within the mandate given to the Commission by the OAS Member States." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DIGEST
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have joined the United States' jurisdictional challenge to the Commission's
- 233
granting of precautionary measures.
2. Expansive Powers
The majority of requests for precautionary measures concern the rights to
life and personal integrity.234 In the context of militarized police forces in most
countries in the region, such figures are not surprising, especially in light of the
lack of judicial oversight for the use of military force. Through the use of urgent
measures, human rights defenders found an expedited avenue to protect victims
of human rights violations. States did not object to the Commission's granting
of said measures-they at least addressed the requests, even if some ultimately
failed to provide the Commission with relevant information regarding the matter
at hand. But as human rights petitions became more complex and diverse in
nature, so did the Commission's precautionary jurisdiction. Latin American
human rights defenders were no longer only facing the urgency of threats against
the lives or physical integrity of individuals persecuted by authoritarian regimes,
but they were dealing with other types of human rights violations as well. Thus,
human rights advocates began to submit requests for precautionary measures in
cases that did not deal directly with threats to basic rights such as the right to life
or physical integrity. The Commission began addressing petitions for urgent
235 236
measures on the rights to freedom of expression, access to healthcare,
children's rights, 23 7 and indigenous peoples' rights. 2 3 8 Again, States did not
OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 7, § E(c) at 296 (2015).
233. In March 2014, the government of Ecuador-one of the most prominent critics of the Inter-
American Commission before, and during, the strengthening process-rejected the request for
precautionary measures on behalf of three journalists charged with the crime of "legal defamation" under
section 494 of the Ecuadorian Penal Code. The government argued first that neither the American
Convention, nor the Commission's Statute "provide power (sic) to the IACHR to order interim measures."
See Ecuador rejects the precautionary measures of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR), MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y MOVILIDAD HUMANA, http://www.cancilleria
.gob.ec/ecuador-rejects-the-precautionary-measures-of-the-inter-american-commission-on-human-
rights-iachr/ (last visited on Jan. 4, 2018).
234. Burbano and Viljoen note that "[i]nterim measures granted to detainees represent 27% (210
out of a total of 771 adopted interim measures) of the total of measures adopted in the inter-American
system. . . ." Clara Burbano-Herrera & Franz Viljoen, Interim Measures Before the Inter-American and
African Human Rights Commissions: Strengths and Weaknesses, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
IN THE 21IT CENTURY 168-69 (Yves Haeck & Eva Brems eds., 2014).
235. See, e.g., Trabajadores de la Radio Calenda v. M6xico, PM, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., ¶¶ 90-
96 (2002).
236. Jorge Odir Miranda Cortez y otros v. El Salvador, PM, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,
OEA/Ser./L/V/II. 111, doc. 20 rev. 1, ¶ 30 (2000); "Amelia" v. Nicaragua, PM, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,
OEA/Ser.L/VII, doc. 5 rev. 1, ¶ 71 (2010); X v. Argentina, PM, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R, Report No.
412/11 OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc. 69 rev. 1, ¶ 29 (2011); Niurka Luque Alvarez v. Cuba, PM, Inter- Am.
Comm'n H.R., Report No. 153/12 (2012).
237. AW v. Guyana, PM 254/07, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.134, doc. 5 rev. 1,
¶ 22 (2008).
238. See e.g., Comunidad Garifuna Triunfo de la Cruz v. Honduras, PM, Case 12.548, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1, ¶ 34 (2006); Comunidad Indigena Maho v. Suriname,
PM, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., OEA/Ser.LN/II, doc. 5 rev. 1, ¶43 (2010); Comunidades Indigenas Mayas
v. Belice, PM, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., OEA/Ser./L/VII.I11, doc. 20 rev., ¶ 11 (2000);
Comunidades Indigenas Ngobe y Otras v. Panama, PM 56/08, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II,
doc. 51 rev. 1, ¶ 43 (2009); Comunidad LofPaichil Antriao del Pueblo Indigena Mapuche v. Argentina,
PM, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc. 69 rev. 1, ¶ 27 (2011); Comunidad Yaxye Axa del
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object to the Commission's expansion of precautionary powers, but rather
responded to the Commission's requests for urgent measures, in some cases
accepting them and acting to enforce them.
In 2010, the Commission granted precautionary measures on behalf of
eighteen Mayan communities who alleged that the government of Guatemala had
failed to obtain the communities' free, prior, and informed consent and to consult
with them before granting a mining concession to the multinational company
GoldCorp to develop a $250-million exploitation project. 2 39 The precautionary
request had been filed as part of a full petition submitted by the communities
three years earlier, and was pending before the Commission at the time of
Guatemala's grant to GoldCorp. In response, the Inter-American Commission
requested that Guatemala suspend all mining activities until it could decide on
the merits of the petition.240 The President of Guatemala initially declared that
the government would not order the suspension of mining activities, 241 a move
that caused human rights defenders-including religious leaders and the Nobel
Peace Prize laureate and Mayan leader Rigoberta Menchi-to publish an open
letter urging him to reconsider his decision.242 The pressure from civil society
proved effective, and the government ultimately stepped back and formally
communicated to the Commission that Guatemala would comply with the
requested measure.243 This opened the door to precautionary measures being
244
used on behalf of large groups of individuals, many of them unidentified.
More significantly, precautionary measures, once conceived as an urgent
mechanism to protect specific victims at the hands of the state, could now halt
Pueblo Enxet-Lengua v. Paraguay, PM, Case 12.313, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., OEA/Ser./L/V/II.1 14,
doc. 5 rev., ¶ 53 (2001); Doce Clanes Saramaka v. Surinam, PM, Case 12.338, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R,
OEA/Ser.L/V/I1. 17, doc. I rev. 1, ¶ 89 (2002); Pueblo Indigena Naso de la Regi6n Bocas del Toro v.
PanamA, PM, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc. 51 rev. 1, $ 44 (2009); Sarayacu v. Ecuador,
PM, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 118, doc. 5 rev. 2, 1 34 (2003).
239. Communities of the Maya People (Sipakepense and Main) of the Sipacapa and San Miguel
Ixtahuacin Municipalities in the Department of San Marcos v. Guatemala, PM, Petition 1566-07, Inter-
Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 20/14 T 6 (2010).
240. Id. Additionally, the Commission asked the state of Guatemala "to implement effective
measures to prevent environmental contamination ... to decontaminate, as much as possible, the water
sources of the 18 beneficiary communities .. . to begin a health assistance and health care program for the
beneficiaries . .. to adopt any other necessary measures to guarantee the life and physical integrity of the
members of the 18 aforementioned Maya communities; and to plan and implement the protection
measures with the participation of the beneficiaries and/or their representatives." Id.
241. Rigoberta Menchii Tum & Alvaro Ramazzini, Por el cierre de la mina Marlin que causa
contaminacidn y enfermedades: Carta abierta a A'lvaro Colom [In support of closing the Marlin mine
which causes pollution and disease: Open letter to Alvaro Colom], AMEICA LATINA EN MOVIMIENTO
REVISTA (June 11, 2010), https://www.alainet.org/es/active/38838.
242. Id.
243. Letter from Dora Ruth del Valle C6bar, President of the Guatemalan Presidential
Commission on Coordination of the Executive's Human Rights Policy, containing the Report by the State
of Guatemala to the Honorable Inter-American Commission on Human Rights regarding Precautionary
Measure (MC 260-07) on behalf of the communities of the Maya People (Sipakepense and Main) of the
Sipacapa and San Miguel Ixtahuacin Municipalities in the Department of San Marcos, Ref. P-1018-
2010/RDVC/HEMJ/ad (June 23, 2010) (translated by author). The government did observe, however, that
their studies did not indicate that the waters were contaminated or that there were diseases related to the
alleged contamination caused by the mine.
244. In fact, in its response to the Commission, the government requested the petitioners "to
provide a detailed and individualized list of alleged incidents concerning the rights to life and physical
integrity." Id. at 3.
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the construction of multimillion-dollar development projects.
Less than a year later, indigenous communities of the Xingu River Basin
in the Brazilian Amazon rainforest turned to the Commission to request
precautionary measures.245 The petitioners' claims were similar to those of the
Mayan communities: they alleged that the government had failed to conduct
consultation processes for the construction of the $14-billion Belo Monte
hydroelectric dam-the world's third-largest dam-considered by the
government to be "a flagship project of national modernization and
development." 246 The project, however, could potentially impact thousands of
indigenous people.247 The petitioners claimed that their rights to life and physical
integrity were at risk due to the construction of the power plant.248 The Inter-
American Commission granted the petitioners' request for urgent measures, and
requested that the State "immediately suspend the licensing process . . . and stop
any construction work from moving forward until certain minimum conditions
[were] met." 249 The Commission ordered Brazil to conduct consultation
'processes pursuant to international standards, to "adopt measures to protect the
life and physical integrity of the members of the indigenous communities living
in voluntary isolation .. . and to prevent the spread of diseases and epidemics . .
as a consequence of the construction of the Belo Monte hydropower plant." 250
This time, however, the State's response was very different. Brazil
vehemently rejected the Commission's measures, calling them "unjustified and
premature." 251 The government of President Dilma Rousseff recalled its
ambassador to the Organization of American States, temporarily withdrew its
candidate for a position on the Inter-American Commission, and ordered a stop
to its $800,000 contribution to the Commission.252 The Brazilian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs released a press statement expressing its "perplexity" with the
Commission's decision, observing-just as Venezuela would do a year later in
its Notice of Denunciation of the American Convention 253 -that petitioners had
not exhausted domestic remedies, and that the Commission had inappropriately
245. Indigenous Communities of the Xingu River Basin, Parit, Brazil v. Brazil, PM 382/10, Inter-
Am. Comm'n H.R. (Apr. 1, 2011).
246. Anthony Hall & Sue Branford, Development, Dams and Dilma: The Saga ofBelo Monte,
38 CRrIcAL Soc. 851, 853 (2012).
247. Tom Phillips, Brazil to Build Controversial Belo Monte Hydroelectric Dam in Amazon
Rainforest, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/feb/0 2 /
brazil-amazon-rainforest-hydroelectric-dam.
248. Indigenous Communities, Inter-Am. .Comm'n H.R., supra note 245.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Brazil Rejects Request to Halt Belo Monte Dam in Amazon, BBC NEWS (Apr. 6, 2011),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-12990099; OEA pede que Brasil suspenda Belo Monte,
e governo se diz 'perplexo,' BBC NEWS BRAsIL (Apr. 5, 2011), https://www.bbc.com/portuguese
/noticias/2011/04/110405belomonteoeapai (translated by author).
252. Natuza Nery, Dilma retalia OEA por Belo Monte e suspende recursos, FOLHA DE S. PAULO
(Apr. 30, 2011), https://wwwl.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/mercado/me300 4 2 0 1 117.htm (translated by author);
see also Denise Chrispim Marin, Brasil ndo paga OEA par causa de Belo Monte, ESTADAO (Oct. 20,
2011) https://economia.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,brasil-nao-paga-oea-por-causa-de-belo-monte-
imp-,787892 (translated by author).
253. See Notice of Denunciation, supra note 189.
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used its precautionary jurisdiction.2 54 In the government's press release, there
was one particular phrase that would prove critical for the strengthening process
that OAS States would soon set up: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that,
"without downplaying the relevance of international human rights systems, it
must be remembered that these systems are subsidiary or complementary..." 2 5 5
Thus, in accusing the Commission of illegitimately intervening in its country's
domestic affairs, Brazil launched the argument for greater deference towards
States.
As one commentator notes, the Belo Monte incident "changed the
relationship between Brazil and the [inter-American system] from one of benign
neglect to outright animosity." 256 Such animosity found reception in States that
had been uncomfortable with the Commission's performance for years, such as
Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador and Nicaragua. It took only a couple of months
for diplomatic efforts to lead to the unprecedented and coordinated critique of
the inter-American human rights system at the June 2011 OAS General
Assembly in El Salvador.
3. New Regulations
After two years of evaluations and debate, the "strengthening process"
came to an end in June of 2013. In a resolution adopted a few months earlier, the
Inter-American Commission addressed all the recommendations made by the
257Working Group, and, despite some States' hesitations about whether the
process should continue, the OAS General Assembly was ultimately satisfied
with the result.258 Some of the key reforms that States imposed on the
Commission were the adoption of clear guidelines and criteria for the
Commission's annual reports and for the processing of precautionary measures
and individual complaints.2 59 The new. Rules of Procedure contain strict and
detailed guidelines for when the Commission may grant precautionary measures,
along with the duty to publish the opinions of all members of the Commission,
especially if some of them disagree with the measures issued. The Commission
254. Minist6rio das Relaq6es Exteriores, Solicitagdo da Comissdo Interamericana de Direitos
Humanos (CIDH) da OEA, Nota 142 (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/notas-a-
imprensa/2 5 55-solicitacao-da-comissao-interamericana-de-direitos-humanos-cidh-da-oea.
255. Id. (translated by author).
256. COURTNEY HILLEBRECHT, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
TRIBUNALS: THE PROBLEM OF COMPLIANCE 132 (2013).
257. IACHR, Res. 1/2013, Reform of the Rules of Procedure, Policies and Practices (Mar. 18,
2013), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/pdf/resolutionl-2013eng.pdf.
258. See OAS General Assembly, AG/RES. 1 (XLIV-E/13), Results of the Process of Reflection
on the Workings of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with a View to Strengthening the Inter-American Human
Rights System, (July 23, 2013) ("[R]ecognizing . . . that the [Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights] has made significant efforts and progress in applying the General Assembly recommendations for
strengthening the system.").
259. As Salazar explains, "[tihe reforms to precautionary measures were aimed at increasing the
transparency of the criteria used to grant them and to identify beneficiaries, and also sought to improve
the follow-up to such measures. With respect to the individual complaint mechanism, the reform offered
predictability in the determination of priorities for the examination and admission of petitions." Salazar,
supra note 212, at 19.
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260
also made changes to its work on human rights monitoring and promotion.
In spite of diplomatic calls for unity and the need to work together to make
the system stronger, scholars and advocates unanimously see the "strengthening
process" as a more or less successful effort to weaken the Commission.261 And
even if some see the outcome as a "happy ending,"262 debates on how to improve
the system's performance-or even discussions on the Inter-American
Commission's location-did not cease with the adoption of the process's final
report. At the 2014 Third Conference on State Parties to the American
Convention, both Ecuador and the host Uruguay led States to adopt a declaration
agreeing to undertake "legal, political, budgetary, regulatory and operational"
studies to change the Commission's venue from Washington, DC, to a city in a
country that is a party to the American Convention, and to regulate the
Commission's special rapporteurships.2 63 In sum, the push for reform does not
seem to have ended with the adoption of the final report.
C. Judicial Pushback
As the inter-American system becomes more complex due to the diversity
of cases it must address and the shift in States' governments from dictatorial to
democratic, States' forms of resistance also diversify. Besides the diplomatic and
political setbacks discussed above, States also push back through judicial
decisions issued by domestic courts. In the context of other human rights
regimes, as explained above, some of the most salient examples of States
resisting international human rights courts are the cases of the United Kingdom
and the Russian Federation, as well as African States' tense relations with the
26International Criminal Court.264 In the Americas as well, judicial resistance is
becoming an increasingly complex form of resistance that calls for scrutiny and
260. The Commission carries out both "protection" and "promotion" activities. Through its
protective jurisdiction, the Commission hears individual petitions, which it may then take to the Inter-
American Court. Issuing precautionary measures in cases of imminent danger is also part of the
Commission's protection activities. "Promotion" activities are usually understood as educational
activities, such as the elaboration of thematic reports, academic conferences and general training to
officials from OAS member States. Some States wanted the Commission to simply-or mostly-focus
on "promotion" activities, leaving all protection tasks to the Court.
261. See Douglass Cassel, The Perfect Storm: Count and Balance, 19 APORTES DPLF 20, 23
(2014) ("Although many elements of the Working Group's report made sense and were accepted by the
Commission, other proposals were designed to appear to strengthen the Commission while in fact
weakening it."); Gabriela Kletzel, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights' New Strategic
Plan: An Opportunity for True Strengthening, 22 INT'L J. HUM. RTs. 1249 (2018); Claudia Martin &
Diego Rodriguez-Pinz6n, Strengthening or Straining the Inter-American Human Rights System, in THE
INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE, PRESENT AND FUTURE 810 (Yves
Haeck et al. eds., 2015) (observing that "it was clear that some of the States that instigated the process
were not content with the work of [the Commission] and had a hidden agenda intended to limit the scope
of the Commission's powers").
262. Cassel, supra note 261, at 23.
263. Third Conference of States Parties to the American Convention on Human Rights,
Declaration of Montevideo (Jan. 22, 2014), http://cancilleria.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/201 4 /01/
Montevideo-Declaration-version-3-01-2014-Ingles.pdf. The Inter-American Commission currently sits in
Washington, D.C. to facilitate its work under and with the main bodies of the Organization of American
States, which is based in Washington, D.C. as well.
264. See supra Part III.
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that scholars have largely neglected.265 In Part II, I discussed how national courts
helped solidify the Inter-American Court's case law on anti-impunity.266 That
was a salient example of national courts following the lead of the Inter-American
Court-a situation that not only helped the Inter-American Court become a
stronger and more legitimate international tribunal, but that also helped States
address human rights violations. But State support may have gone too far. The
Court has become a super-constitutional tribunal, not an international court with
contained powers,267 and States have started to perceive the system as too
intrusive. As I have written before, an example of such intrusiveness is the use
of "conventionality control," the Inter-American Court's doctrine whereby all
domestic judges must follow, and give preference to, the Court's interpretation
of fundamental rights.268
I now turn my attention to instances where national courts do the opposite
of what I traced in Part II of this Article. Instances of resistance may be read both
as efforts to improve the system's legitimacy-for instance, when a domestic
court understands itself as a partner in legitimizing the international regime-or
to undermine it-for example, when the domestic court sees the system as being
too intrusive or plainly illegitimate. The case study I explore in this section
illustrates this twofold model of judicial pushback as a resistance method: the
Argentinean Supreme Court could be seen as either contributing to the Inter-
American Court's overall legitimacy by challenging it or seeking to undermine
the Inter-American Court's assertion of power as a super-constitutional tribunal
with regional reach. As with instances of covert resistance identified in the
previous section, here again it is necessary to dig into the actors' motivations and
their actions' ultimate effects. Despite the immediate hard consequences-i.e.,
the rebuke of international authority-domestic judicial pushback can contribute
to a process of improvement of the human rights system. It may reduce the
international court's powers (potestas), but in so doing it may well enhance the
international court's authority (auctoritas).
1. Domestic Challenge
On February 14, 2017, the Argentinean Supreme Court handed down a
decision that sent shock waves through the field of regional human rights law.
The ruling concerned the implementation of a 2011 Inter-American Court of
Human Rights decision against Argentina in which the Court had found the State
265. But see Soley & Steininger, supra note 78. See also Alexandra Huneeus, Courts Resisting
Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court's Struggle to Enforce Human Rights, 44 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 493 (2011). Huneeus' analysis deals with national courts' inability or unwillingness to enforce
decisions by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and assumes a top-down relation among
international courts and domestic courts. My discussion aims at theorizing domestic courts' resistance in
the context of agonistic interactions among courts and, more specifically, without assuming a vertical
relationship among them.
266. See supra Part II.B.
267. Ariel E. Dulitzky, An Inter-American Constitutional Court? The Invention of the
Conventionality Control by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 50 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 45, 52
(2015).
268. See Jorge Contesse, The Final Word? Constitutional Dialogue and the Inter-American
Court ofHuman Rights, 15 INT'L J. CONST. L. 414,417 (2017).
218 [Vol. 44: 2
Resisting the Inter-American Human Rights System
to be in violation of the American Convention.
At issue was a 2001 decision in which Argentina's Supreme Court affirmed
a civil judgment against two publishers, Jorge Fontevecchia and H6ctor
D'Amico, for running stories about an unacknowledged child of then-President
269Carlos Menem. In response, the journalists filed a case against Argentina
before the inter-American human rights system. Ten years later, the Inter-
American Court ordered the State to "revoke the decision in its entirety." 270
Argentina's executive branch then asked the Supreme Court to comply with the
Inter-American Court's remedy-that is, to revoke its 2001 ruling.
The Supreme Court, however, declined to do so. It reasoned that the Inter-
American Court lacked the authority to order the revocation of a domestic
judgment, as doing so exceeded its powers under the American Convention.271
The decision stunned commentators and legal scholars.27 2 Human rights
organizations decried it, claiming that the Court had "unlatched" Argentina from
273
the inter-American human rights system,27 and a member of the Inter-American
Court, an Argentinean jurist who had previously served on the country's
274
Supreme Court, rebuked the decision in the press.
These criticisms suggested that Argentina, a country once very supportive
of the international system, was now abruptly compromising it.275 To fully
understand the reasoning and impact of the Argentinean Supreme Court decision,
we need to consider several aspects of the decision with caution.
First, in the decision, the Supreme Court effectively reined in its otherwise
276
progressive approach toward the incorporation of international law. In a
269. Fontevecchia and D'Amico v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 238 (Nov. 29, 2011).
270. Id. 1 105. The Court also ordered the publication of the judgment in social and official
publications. Id. ¶¶ 108-110.
271. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n, supra note 2, 1 11.
272. Victor Abramovich, Comentarios sobre el "caso Fontevecchia," CENTRO DE JUSTICIA Y
DERECHOS HuMANOS UNLA (Feb. 17, 2017), http://ijdh.unla.edu.ar/advf/documentos/2017/02/58a
bOlOal Od4c.pdf; Gustavo Arballo, La Corte Argentinafrente a la Corte Interamericana: la resolucidn de
no-cumplimiento del caso Fontevecchia, SABER LEYES NO ES SABER DERECHO (Feb. 14, 2017),
http://www.saberderecho.com/2017/02/la-corte-argentina-frente-la-corte.html; Alberto Bovino, Caso
Fontevecchia: la incompetencia de un tribunal, NO HAY DERECHO (Feb. 24, 2017), http://noh
uboderecho.blogspot.com/2017/02/caso-fontevecchia-la-incompetencia-de.btml; Roberto Gargarella, La
Corte Suprema y los alcances de las decisiones de la Corte Interamericana, SEMINARIO DE TEORIA
CONSTITUCIONAL Y FILOSOFIA POLiTICA (Feb. 15, 2017), http://seminariogargarella.blogspot
.com/2017/02/la-corte-suprema-y-los-alcances-de-las.html.
273. Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, Las consecuencias delfallo de la Corte Suprema
para la vigencia de los derechos humanos en la Argentina, DPLF BLOG (Feb. 23, 2017),
https:/dplfblog.com/2017/02/23/las-consecuencias-del-fallo-de-la-corte-suprema-para-la-vigencia-de-
los-derechos-humanos-en-la-argentina/.
274. Martin Granovsky, Elfallo choca hasta con el Predmbulo, PAGINA 12 (Feb. 19, 2017),
https://www.paginal2.com.ar/21115-el-fallo-choca-hasta-con-el-preambulo; Radl Zaffaroni, La Corte
Suprema declara su independencia del Estado, AGENCIA PACO URONDO (Feb. 15, 2017),
https://agenciapacourondo.com.ar/secciones/ddhh/22099-zaffaroni-la-corte-suprema-declara-su-
independencia-del-estado.
275. Daniel Politi, Argentines Fight Court's Leniency for Human Rights Crimes, N.Y. TIMES
(May 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/world/americas/argentina-mauricio-macri-luis-
muia.html
276. Remarkably, the Court cited cases decided over twenty years prior to buttress its claims on
subsidiarity. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n, supra note 2, ¶ 9.
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critical passage, the Court declared that "[i]t is beyond discussion that the Inter-
American Court's decision in contentious cases against the Argentinian State
are, in principle, binding on the State." 277 Prior to this decision, compliance with
international decisions was perceived as mandatory, without qualifications. It
was not until now that the court appeared to articulate some space between theory
and practice. This allows domestic noncompliance with decisions from the Inter-
American Court and potentially with other treaties enshrined in the Argentinean
Constitution.278
Second, the Argentinean court's decision to review the jurisdictional
powers of the Inter-American Court is itself astonishing. By purporting to review
the powers of an international tribunal, the Supreme Court of Argentina, a
domestic body, placed itself above the international system. The Court thus went
further than merely unlatching Argentina from the system of human rights law
enforcement.
Third, the Argentinean court's decision went to the core of a critical issue:
it resisted the Inter-American Court's order to "revoke" a decision, an order that
279typically only superior courts may give to lower courts. Such pretension, the
Argentinean court observed, would make the Inter-American Court a court of
"fourth instance" or of cassation.280 In the Argentinean court's view, this is not
the role of the international tribunal. In the international plane, the Inter-
American Court is the final interpreter of the norms of the American Convention,
but with respect to domestic law, the final interpreter is the Supreme Court.2 81 it
would violate the Argentinian Constitution, the Argentinean court believed, to
revoke a judicial decision merely upon an order from an international tribunal.2 82
Finally, the Argentinean court took issue with the nature of the Inter-
American court's order-an important issue at the core of the implementation of
regional human rights law. When an international court finds that a state has
violated a regional human rights treaty, it can order the state to remedy the
277. Id. ¶ 6 (emphasis added) (translated by author).
278. Art. 75(22), CONSTITUTION OF THE ARGENTINE NATION [ARG.] [CONSTITUTION].
279. Interestingly, the Spanish version of the Inter-American Court's ruling refers to Argentina's
duty to "refrain from enforcing" ("dejar sin efecto") the 2001 ruling by the Supreme Court. The English
(official) translation uses the verb "to revoke." When the Argentinean Supreme Court issued its opinion,
in February 2017, it also issued a press release summarizing the court's decision. The press release (in
Spanish) stated that the Supreme Court had found that it could not "revoke" ("revocar") its 2001 decision,
as requested by the Inter-American Court. See La Corte sostuvo que la Corte Interamericana de Derechos
Humanos no puede revocar sentencias del Mdximo Tribunal argentino, CENTRO DE INFORMACION
JUDIcIAL (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.cij.gov.ar/nota-24822-La-Corte-sostuvo-que-la-Corte-
Interamericana-de-Derechos-Humanos-no-puede-revocar-sentencias-del-M-ximo-Tribunal-
argentino.html.
280. See id. ¶ 11 (Maqueda, J., dissenting).
281. Interestingly, almost all constitutional judges interviewed for this study made the exact same
proposition: the Inter-American Court is a tribunal that deserves respect, but it cannot dictate how
domestic courts should interpret domestic law-let alone order them to revoke a decision or reopen cases.
282. The Court finds that the Inter-American Court's remedy ordering Argentina "refrain from
enforcing" ("dejar sin efecto") is synonymous with revocation. Id. ¶ 11. The Argentinean Court is correct
in that this is how the Inter-American Court translated the remedy into the English version of the judgment
By making the words synonyms in Spanish, however, the Argentinean Court limited the options available
domestically to comply with the remedy. The Supreme Court could have remanded the case both to the
executive and Congress, either by declaring that it faced a problem that Congress could address or by
exploring alternatives to judicially revoking a firm decision.
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violation. But, can it also specify how the state is to remedy the violation? This
is, to be sure, what the Inter-American Court has done in its three decades of
detailed and exhaustive remedial jurisprudence.283 In its 2017 decision, the
Argentinean court directly challenged that approach. The Argentinean court's
claim was simple: a State's compliance is limited by its own political structure
and by the domestic principle of separation of powers. It is, of course, possible
to challenge the Argentinean court's interpretation, but the nature of this
challenge raises another important question: should a State be allowed to
determine, to some extent, its means of compliance with the general holding of
an international tribunal's order?
A critical factor in the Argentinean court's rebuke of the Inter-American
Court's authority concerns the appointment of two new justices by President
Mauricio Macri in 2016: Carlos Rosenkrantz and Horacio Rosatti. Although no
single Justice authored the February 2017 ruling in Fontevecchia, it is easy to
detect Justice Rosenkrantz's judicial philosophy in the judgment. Before joining
the Court, Rosenkrantz, a prominent legal scholar, actively wrote against the use
of foreign precedents by constitutional courts.284 As explained in Part II, the
Supreme Court of Argentina was a key adopter of the Barrios Altos anti-
impunity doctrine;285 Rosenkrantz, however, vehemently rejected the Court's
receptive approach to inter-American human rights caselaw.2 Citing
international human rights law was, according to Rosenkrantz, similar to
resorting to "transcendent rules"-that is, "norms that are beyond the
Constitution."287
Justice Rosenkrantz's academic writings took the form ofjudicial doctrine,
first in Fontevecchia, and then a few months later in Bignone, a controversial
decision that allowed an individual convicted for torture and kidnapping during
the Argentinean dictatorship to benefit from a 1990s law enacted to address the
extremely lengthy periods of pre-trial detention. The ruling sparked massive
283. See Thomas M. Antkowiak, Remedial Approaches to Human Rights Violations: The Inter-
American Court ofHuman Rights and Beyond, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 351 (2008).
284. See Carlos F. Rosenkrantz, Against Borrowings and Other Nonauthoritative Uses of
Foreign Law, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 269 (2003).
285. See supra Part II.B.2.
286. See Carlos F. Rosenkrantz, Advertencias a un internacionalista (a los problemas de Simdn
y Mazzeo), 8 REv. JUR. U. PALERMO 203,207-09 (2007).
287. Id. at 210 (emphasis added). Rosenkrantz's assertion is problematic. First, he allegedly
adopts the notion of "transcendent rules" from Owen Fiss's work but fails to note that Fiss, in turn, has
taken the notion from Frank Michelman's work. See Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 13 (1986). Second, and more importantly, Rosenkrantz's claim that the use of international
human rights law is equivalent to utilizing "norms that are beyond the Constitution" is in plain
contradiction with the Argentinean Constitution, which expressly incorporates human rights treaties into
its text.
288. La Corte Suprema, por mayoria, declard aplicable el cdmputo del 2x1 para la prisidn en
un caso de delitos de lesa humanidad, CENTRO DE INFORMACI6N JUDICIAL (May 3, 2017),
https://www.cij.gov.ar/nota-25746-La-Corte-Suprema--por-mayor-a--declar--aplicable-el-c-mputo-del-
2x1-para-la-prisi-n-en-un-caso-de-delitos-de-lesa-humanidad.html. Law No. 24,390, known as "the 2x1
Act," allowed defendants in pre-trial detention to have their pre-trial time counted toward their sentences.
The 2x1 Act, Ley 24.390 (1994 (Arg.). Congress enacted the "2x1 Act" to address the severe crisis of
overcrowded prisons and the extensive use of pre-trial detention. The law remained in effect from 1994
to 2001. Until the Muilia decision, the Supreme Court ruled that individuals convicted for human rights
violations committed during the dictatorship could not benefit from the "2x I" law.
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demonstrations against the Supreme Court and propelled Congress to rapidly
pass an "interpretative law" that clarified the scope and meaning of the "2x1"
benefit as not applicable to human rights violators. 289 A year later, the
Argentinean court stepped back and reinstated its earlier doctrine, with
290Rosenkrantz writing a dissenting opinion. From a domestic perspective, it
could be argued that the judicial pushback stemmed from a single state actor-
the Supreme Court-or even further, from a contingent majority in the court that
was led by a justice who views international human rights law as "foreign" law.
But the full story is that decisions such as Fontevecchia and Bignone are possible
due to a larger context in which international organs also bear responsibility in
how they define their powers vis-a-vis domestic actors. 2 9 1
2. International Accommodation
In Fontevecchia, the Inter-American Court had the power to hold that
Argentina had violated the petitioners' right to freedom of expression; however,
it does not follow from that power that the Inter-American Court can determine
the precise means that the State must use to comply with the judgment. By
ordering a state to revoke a judicial decision without considering the domestic
allocation of powers, the Inter-American Court armed opponents to the Court's
judicial activism with solid grounds for critique. 292
Notwithstanding this potential overreach, the Argentinean court in its
initial response missed a valuable opportunity to craft a viable way forward. The
Court could (and should) have honored the state's international obligations and
accords with the country's constitutional practice. For instance, the Argentinean
court could have remanded the case back to Argentina's executive or Congress,
requesting that they implement the tribunal's order in a way that achieved
international compliance pursuant to constitutional provisions, without violating
289. Conductas Delictivas. Delitos de Lesa Humanidad, Genocidio o Crimenes de Guerra, Ley
27362 (2017) (Arg.).
290. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice].
4/12/2018, "Recurso de hecho deducido por Batalla, Rufino en la causa Hidalgo Garz6n, Carlos del Seilor
y otros," FLP 91003389/2012/T01/93/1/RH 1 (Arg.), https://cijur.mpba.gov.arfiles/content/
rufino%20batalla.pdf.
291. For example, in the case of the Dominican Republic's Constitutional Court's decisions
discussed above, see Part IV.A.1. Other State actors and even civil society seem to largely back the
Dominican court's antagonistic approach toward the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Five years
after the TC/0256/14 decision, neither the executive nor the Dominican Congress have attempted to fix
the Constitutional Court's partial exit from the inter-American human rights system. In a country visit
conducted in 2015, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights observed that individuals who
criticized the Dominican court's 2013 decision (which was the antecedent to Judgment TC/0256/14) were
called "traitors," and received threats. See Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Situation of Human Rights in the
Dominican Republic, OEA/Ser.L/V/II doc. 45/15, at 13, ¶ 10 (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.
oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/dominicanrepublic-2015.pdf. Polls have shown that 66% of Dominicans
reject people of Haitian descent. See Gabriela Alvarez Guerrero, La discriminacidn y la #GallupHoy,
ACENTO (Sept. 12, 2014) https://acento.com.do/2014/opinion/8173285-la-discriminacion-y-la-gallup
hoy/. Thus, while the instances of resistance in Argentina may be episodic, the Dominican case seems to
exemplify a more systemic resistance against the system, due to the system's protection of Haitians and
Dominicans of Haitian descent.
292. See Jorge Contesse, Contestation and Deference in the Inter-American Human Rights
System, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 137-38 (2016).
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the judicial supremacy of Argentina's Supreme Court or domestic constitutional
law. In turn, the Inter-American Court could have requested the State to remedy
the violation using all domestic means at the State's disposition, rather than
demanding that it effect one particular remedy. However, because neither
judicial body adopted those solutions, a lack of legal mechanisms to address the
dispute became apparent, as did the implication that domestic courts that used to
be friendly toward the inter-American system could have adopted a different
posture.
As a response, the Inter-American Court convened a compliance
monitoring hearing in August 2017, where the Argentinean government would
have to explain to the Court the implications of the February 2017 Supreme
Court decision. Lawyers for the victims and the Inter-American Commission
were also present. The State representatives explained that the executive was
unable to do anything after the Supreme Court had found that it could not revoke
(or halt the effects of) its 2001 decision.293 Relying on a separation of powers
argument, the government claimed that the Supreme Court was sovereign to
interpret the Constitution, and that the executive could not interfere with the
Court's judicial interpretative powers. As the government's representatives put
it, "the Supreme Court is the Argentinean State," 294 and therefore the opinion of
the Supreme Court was the opinion of the State.
After the hearing, the Inter-American Court issued a resolution stating that
Argentina needed to identify which domestic avenues would allow the State to
295
comply with the Inter-American Court's judgment. It also noted that revoking
the 2001 decision was not the only possible remedy to comply; 2 9 6 that, in the
past, Argentina and other States had not challenged the Inter-American Court's
authority to order these remedies; 297 and that the State had alternative
mechanisms to comply with the judgment-for instance, it could remove the
decision from all electronic websites, or order that an annotation be made on the
margins of the decision stating that the Inter-American Court had declared it
298
incompatible with the American Convention on Human Rights.
Two months later, the Supreme Court of Argentina put an end to the stand-
off between the two courts: it issued a four-paragraph resolution observing two
important facts. First, the Supreme Court observed that the Inter-American Court
had acknowledged that revocation was not the only mechanism for complying
with the Inter-American Court's 2001 judgment against Argentina, in line with
293. See Fontevecchia and D'Amico v. Argentina, Hearing on Monitoring Compliance with
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Aug. 21, 2017), https://vimeo.com/23051005 3 .
294. Id. at min. 1:07:27 (translation by author). The statement was made in response to a question
by Judge Eduardo Vio Grossi, who asked whether the government's position was that of the Supreme
Court.
295. See Fontevecchia and D'Amico v. Argentina, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H. R., Considering ¶ 16 (Oct. 18, 2017).
296. Id. j 20.
297. Id.
298. Id. ¶ 21. The Inter-American Court also found that Argentina does not have the power to
determine when an Inter-American Court decision is obligatory, and that the Argentinean court's decision
had departed from established precedent on the legal force of international judgments. Id ¶ 25.
2232019]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
the Argentinean court's decision of February 2017.299 Second, it observed that
the Inter-American Court's "suggestion" to make an annotation in the margins
of the 2001 decision "does not violate public law principles established in the
Argentinean Constitution."300 Hence, the Supreme Court "accepted" the Inter-
American Court's suggestion.so0
In conclusion, the incident forced the Inter-American Court to elaborate
upon its supervisory jurisdiction at greater length. And, while the Argentinean
court did put an end to the tense back-and-forth, the underlying reasons for the
domestic court's challenge to the authority of the regional human rights tribunal
may not have dissipated.
V. AVENUES FOR REFORM
I have explored how the inter-American human rights system first gained
influence on States, and how those same States have recently become less
receptive of, and at times directly confrontational towards, the system. I now turn
my attention to two areas where the system could make progress toward
complying with two goals that are seemingly in tension: on the one hand, the
protection of human rights at a regional level, and, on the other, the collaboration
between States and international bodies.
I argue that the system could address the tension in at least two ways. First,
the Inter-American Court should revisit the "fourth instance" doctrine, in which
international tribunals do not act as higher or appellate courts, inquiring into both
facts and evidence. Although the Inter-American Court has repeatedly stated that
it is not a fourth instance court, many of its decisions-and States' reactions to
the Court's decisions-show that it may indeed be acting as such. Revising the
fourth instance doctrine would be an appropriate response to the problems
identified in this Article.
Second, scholars have often discussed the most critical problem with
international human rights law: States' lack of compliance with international
bodies' decisions and recommendations.302 The inter-American human rights
system is no exception. 303 In other human rights systems, regional human rights
299. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
5/12/2017, Res. 4015/17 ¶¶ 1-2 (Arg.).
300. Id. ¶4.
301. Id.
302. See, e.g., Darren Hawkins, Explaining Costly International Institutions: Persuasion and
Enforceable Human Rights Norms, 48 INT'L STUD. Q. 779 (2004); Courtney Hillebrecht, Rethinking
Compliance: The Challenges and Prospects of Measuring Compliance with International Human Rights
Tribunals, 1 J. HuM. RTS. PRAC. 362 (2009) [hereinafter Hillebrecht, Rethinking Compliance]; Courtney
Hillebrecht, The Power of Human Rights Tribunals: Compliance with the European Court of Human
Rights and Domestic Policy Change, 20 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 1100 (2014); Jasper Krommendijk, The
Domestic Effectiveness ofInternational Human Rights Monitoring in EstablishedDemocracies: The Case
of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 10 REv. INT'L ORG. 489 (2015).
303. See David C. Baluarte, Strategizing for Compliance: The Evolution ofa Compliance Phase
ofInter-American Court Litigation and the Strategic Imperative For Victims' Representatives, 27 AM. U.
INT'L L. REv. 263 (2012); Mathias Poertner, Institutional Capacity for Compliance: Domestic Compliance
with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Aug. 29-Sept. 1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2299763).
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courts are not tasked with monitoring compliance of their own judgments: in
Europe, for example, monitoring compliance is the function of the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe-a political, not judicial, body. The
Committee reviews whether or not States that have been found in violation of
the European Convention of Human Rights by a decision of the European Court
are complying with the judgment.3 04
In the Americas, the Organization of American States' Permanent Council
has left this task unattended, forcing the Inter-American Court not only to decide
cases, but also to supervise States' compliance with its decisions. The cases
analyzed in this Article show that OAS member States remain silent when
another State acts in ways that may undermine the system's strength. The time
has come to change States' passivity and explore ways in which the OAS
Permanent Council, or a new body, may undertake the critical task of monitoring
compliance with the Court's rulings. Scholars seem more concerned with the
most serious forms of resistance-particularly backlash, as expressed in States'
actual or threatened exits from treaties.305 But Fontevecchia shows how the Inter-
American Court's authority can be undermined in ways that may seem less
serious or confrontational but are ultimately more damaging to the Court's
authority. When the Court is forced to monitor compliance by holding
unproductive hearings or requesting information from States that intend never to
provide it, this is an indication that monitoring compliance should no longer be
.a (purely) judicial task. Under such circumstances, compliance is better suited as
a political task.
A. Revisiting the Fourth Instance Doctrine
Human rights courts assert subsidiary jurisdiction.306 Their task is to
intervene when domestic authorities are either unwilling or unable to provide
remedies to human rights violations. Human rights law has devised different
mechanisms for materializing its subsidiary nature-arguably the most notorious
aspect of which is the requirement that all domestic remedies be exhausted
before filing an international complaint. 30 7
The rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies is not, however, the only
304. Article 46.2 of the European Convention on Human Rights states: "The final judgment of
the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution." Council
of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Foundational Freedoms art. 46.2, Nov. 4,
1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
305. See Mikael Rask Madsen et al., Backlash Against International Courts: Explaining the
Forms and Patterns ofResistance to International Courts, 14 INT'L J.L. IN CONTEXT 197 (2018). On the
particular case of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights see Soley & Steininger, supra note 78.
306. See Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle ofInternational Human Rights
Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 38 (2003).
307. See Cesare P.R. Romano, The Rule ofPrior Exhaustion ofDomestic Remedies: Theory and
Practice in International Human Rights Procedures, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 561, 561-62 (Nerina Boschiero et al. eds., 2013) (stating that
the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is arguably the most important admissibility requirement in
international human rights procedure). According to the International Court of Justice, the exhaustion rule
"is a well-established rule of customary international law." See Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), Preliminary
Objections, 1959 I.C.J. 6, 27 (Mar. 21).
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mechanism to ensure that human rights law does not override States' legal
authority. International courts and human rights bodies have also developed the
"fourth instance doctrine" to calibrate the level of interference that international
courts may legitimately exert upon States. Under the fourth instance doctrine,
international courts must refrain from addressing errors of fact or law that
national courts may have made in domestic proceedings. 30 Under this doctrine,
the role of international courts is not to consider the merits or fairness of a
domestic decision but rather to identify a violation of rights. As a European
commentator has put it, the fourth instance doctrine "acts as a brake on the
[European Court of Human Rights'] interpretations of the
[European] Convention by ensuring that it bears in mind the constitutional limits
on its competence."309 However, the doctrine is not easy to apply, and, more
significantly, the lack of clear criteria for its application can have important
consequences for how States perceive international courts' authority. The
Argentinean case previously discussed is a good example of this problem.
1. The Fourth Instance Doctrine
In the late 1980s, the inter-American human rights system adopted the
fourth instance doctrine. 3 10 In Marzioni v. Argentina, the Inter-American
Commission declared that "the Commission cannot review the judgments issued
by the domestic courts acting within their competence and with due judicial
guarantees, unless it considers that a possible violation of the Convention is
involved." 3 11 The Commission's articulation of the doctrine-or "formula," as
the Commission called it-and that of the European Court of Human Rights312
share the same key component: international human rights bodies should not act
as domestic appellate courts with the power to review how a lower court has
found facts and how it has applied (or misapplied) the law to those facts.
In exploring the European articulation of the doctrine, however, one must
not lose sight of a critical feature: in European human rights law, the fourth
instance doctrine exists as a consequence of, and in the company of, a unique
understanding of the subsidiarity principle, with the margin of appreciation
doctrine as a corollary. 313 European States recently reiterated the validity of the
308. The first articulation of the fourth instance doctrine is found in the jurisprudence of the
European Court offHuman Rights, in the case ofXv. Belgium, 458/59 (Mar. 29,1960). The United Nations
Human Rights Committee has also adopted the doctrine. See Pillai v. Canada, $ 11.2, Views, U.N. Human
Rights Committee, Communication No. 1763/2008, U.N. Doc. C/101/D/1763/2008 (2011); Masih v.
Canada, Views, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1881/2009, U.N. Doc.
C/108/D/1881/2009, ¶ 2 (2013) (Dissenting opinion of Mr Yuval Shany) (cited in Maija Dahlberg, '...It
is Not Its Task to Act as a Court ofFourth Instance': The Case ofthe European Court ofHuman Rights,
7 EUR. J. LEG. STuD. 77, 86 (2014)).
309. See Dahlberg, supra note 308, at 83.
310. Clifton Wright v. Jamaica, Case 9260, Inter-Am. Comm'n. H. R., OEA/ser. L/V/II.74, doc.
10 rev. 1 (1988).
311. Case 11.673, Inter-Am. Comm'n. H. R., OEA/ser. L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. 76, ¶ 50 (1997).
312. In a 1988 decision, the European Court declared: "it is not [the Court's] function to deal
with errors of fact or of law allegedly committed by a national court unless and insofar as they may have
infringed rights and freedoms protected by the (European] Convention." Schenk v. Switzerland, App. No.
10862/84, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 26, T45 (July 12, 1988).
313. Dahlberg, supra note 308, at 78-80.
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subsidiarity principle and the margin of appreciation doctrine.314 The
prominence of these principles in Europe have no parallel in Latin America,
where both commentators and the Inter-American Court itself have persistently
shied away from granting States any form of margin of appreciation. 315 This
attitude needs to be reexamined in light of both the Court's case law and States'
multi-layered forms of resistance against the system.
Almost two decades ago, legal scholars anticipated that the inter-American
system would make use of the doctrine in a way similar to the European Court,
but this prediction has proven wrong.316 Inter-American human rights law has
only expanded in both scope and competence, even in instances where States
that have independent judiciaries claim degrees of deference. 3 The most salient
case is a 2011 decision by the Inter-American Court that declared invalid two
Uruguayan referenda in which the Uruguayan people voted in favor of upholding
their amnesty law.31 In Gelman, the Inter-American Court reiterated its doctrine
on amnesty laws-i.e., that such laws are incompatible with the American
Convention-without giving any special consideration to the fact that Uruguay
is a State with an independent judiciary, or the fact that the decision to uphold
the country's expiry law rested on a decision by the people of Uruguay, not by
its judiciary, nor its Congress. The Court's bold assertion of authority has been
subject to the criticism of "punitivism"-a form of expansive and maximalist
319jurisprudence.
The Inter-American Court has thus far failed to articulate systematic case
law on the fourth instance doctrine and on deference. The European Court mainly
applies the doctrine in cases concerning the application of the right to a fair
trial,320 an area in which the Inter-American Court has ruled multiple times.321
Despite its adoption of the fourth instance doctrine, inter-American human rights
bodies have not followed the European model in drawing clear boundaries that
would allow States to anticipate whether or not they will be granted some degree
of deference.
314. See generally Madsen, supra note 14.
315. See Pablo Contreras, National Discretion and International Deference in the Restriction of
Human Rights: A Comparison Between the Jurisprudence of the European and the Inter-American Court
ofHuman Rights, 11 Nw. J. INT'L HUM. RTs. 28 (2012).
316. An expert on the inter-American system wrote in 2001: "[S]tates that have independent and
impartial judiciaries will be treated with more deference than those states where such independence or
impartiality is compromised." Diego Rodriguez Pinz6n, The "Victim " Requirement, the Fourth Instance
Formula and the Notion of "Person" in the Individual Compliant Procedure of the Inter-American
Human Rights System, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 369, 380 (2001).
317. See Contesse, supra note 292, at 145.
318. Gelman v. Uruguay, Merits and Reparations, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 221, If 195-
206 (Feb. 24, 2011).
319. See Ezequiel Malarino, Judicial Activism, Punitivism and Supranationalisation: Illiberal
and Antidemocratic Tendencies of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 12 INT'L CRIM. L. REV.
665, 681-83 (2012).
320. Dahlberg, supra note 308, at 85.
321. See, e.g., Apitz Barbera v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 182 (Aug. 5, 2008); Salvador Chiriboga v. Ecuador,
Preliminary Objection and Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 179 (May 6, 2008); Genie
Lacayo v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 30 (Jan.
29, 1997).
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Constitutional judges in Latin American are aware of this problem. In a
series of interviews conducted for this study, justices from several high courts of
Latin America expressed concern, and, in some cases, discontent with the Inter-
American Court's handling of cases. In the eloquent words of one justice on the
Supreme Court of Chile: "we respect the authority of the Inter-American Court
as a legal tribunal. But its role is to interpret an international treaty-our role is
to interpret domestic law, our own Constitution. It is not desirable that the Court
pretend to rule upon us." 322 Another constitutional justice espoused the pervasive
view among them that regional courts should decide as if human rights cases
were not about the application of hard and fast rules but rather about the
application of principles. 323 The reference to the distinction between rules and
principles is directed to the work of legal theorists Ronald Dworkin324 and Robert
Alexy.325 The claim is that the Inter-American Court should establish
differentiated criteria depending on the type of violation it addresses, without a
one-size-fits-all model of adjudication. Or, as the former Chief Justice of Chile's
Constitutional Court put it: "the Inter-American Court has steadily transformed
into a supranational tribunal with powers that go beyond what States intended
when they adopted the American Convention ... national judges are displeased
because the Court is actually reviewing our decisions." 326
2. Reforming the Doctrine for the Inter-American System
The inter-American human rights system must address instances of
resistance. When such resistance comes from judicial actors, as in the cases of
the Dominican Constitutional Court or the Argentinean Supreme Court, the
Inter-American Court should directly engage with such resistance, viewing it as
an opportunity to improve the Court's authority and legitimacy. An important
reform could concern the levels of deference the Court provides to States when
a violation of rights is submitted for its consideration. Although the system
formally embraces the fourth instance doctrine, it has so far failed to provide a
clear set of criteria to determine under what circumstances States enjoy some
level of discretion.
The doctrine's basic formulation, and not just in the context of the inter-
American system, calls for reconsideration. Recall that under the doctrine,
international courts should not review domestic matters of fact and law unless
the domestic decision was obtained in violation of due process rights or any other
right guaranteed by international or regional human rights treaties. As
evidenced by this last caveat, the doctrine seems to carry with it a tension that is
difficult to reconcile: international courts must not act as appellate courts as per
322. Interview with Justice 1 of the Supreme Court of Chile, Santiago (Dec. 6, 2017) (name
omitted to preserve anonymity).
323. Interview with Justice 10 of the Supreme Court of Chile, Santiago (Jan. 4, 2018) (name
omitted to preserve anonymity).
324. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
325. See ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Julian Rivers trans., 2010).
326. Interview with Justice 3 of the Constitutional Court of Chile, Santiago (Dec. 29, 2017)
(name omitted to preserve anonymity).
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the fourth instance doctrine, but if national courts violate the rights of an
individual, then the fourth instance doctrine does not apply.
Under the doctrine, international courts may expand their competence-
just as the Inter-American Court has done over the past decades-to find
violations beyond the more limited domain of due process rights.3 27 Consider
Fontevecchia: the Argentinean journalists who challenged their conviction for
defamation did not allege a violation of their rights to a fair trial. The journalists
pleaded their case in Argentinean courts to challenge President Menem's lawsuit
under Argentinean law. While the trial itself was procedurally valid, the
journalists alleged that the substance of the Argentinean court's ruling violated
their right to freedom of expression. The Inter-American Court was substantially
correct in finding that, by convicting journalists for publishing stories of public
interest, Argentina violated its international human rights obligation. However,
the fourth instance doctrine indicates that if a State has "independent and
impartial judiciaries,"328 then it should enjoy a higher degree of deference. In the
Fontevecchia case, the convicted journalists did not impugn the Argentinian
judiciary's independence and impartiality.
I am not arguing that the Inter-American Court should have refrained from
intervening and allowed journalists to be silenced when investigating allegations
of misconduct by political authorities. I am pointing out, however, that under the
original formulation of the fourth instance doctrine, intervention by an
international court may not necessarily have been authorized. Therefore, the
issue seems to be whether or not the fourth instance doctrine lacks criteria for its
proper application.
Inter-American human rights bodies need not go beyond their existing case
law to refine their articulation of the fourth instance doctrine. First, the Court
should engage with the documentation compiled by the Commission on how
States protect-or fail to protect-human rights. As already explained, the
Commission publishes an annual report documenting the most critical human
rights problems in the region-with special reference to those countries where
human rights violations are acute. If the Court handles a case from a country that,
according to the Commission's reports, has an "independent judiciary," then the
Court should adopt a more deferential approach. For example, in Gelman, the
Court should not have dismissed Uruguay's sovereignty claim so easily. On the
327. On the expansion of the Court's case law, see Foreword, in THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE, PRESENT AND FUTURE, x (Yves Haeck et al. eds., 2015)
(noting that the Court's jurisprudence "is not only observed and closely followed by the High Courts of
the region, but it also guides the design of laws and public policy within States"). See also THOMAS M.
ANTKOWIAK & ALEJANDRA GONZA, THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSENTIAL
RIGHTS (2017); LAURENCE BURGORGUE-LARSEN & AMAYA UBEDA DE TORRES, THE INTER-AMERICAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: CASE-LAW AND COMMENTARY (2011); JOE M. PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE OFTHE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2014). On how international
tribunals can expand their powers or even modify the norms of treaties through judicial interpretation, see
Julian Arato, Treaty Interpretation and Constitutional Transformation: Change in International
Organizations, 38 YALE J. INT'L L. 289 (2013) (comparing approaches toward subsequent practice in the
case law of the World Trade Organization's Appellate Body, the International Court of Justice, and the
European Court of Human Rights).
328. Rodriguez Pinz6n, supra note 311, at 380.
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other hand, when handling cases from Venezuela-before the country
denounced the American Convention in 2012-the Court could have
legitimately granted much less deference, because official documents from the
inter-American human rights system-as well as reports from civil society
organizations-indicated that Venezuela's courts were neither independent nor
impartial.3 2 9
Critics of this differentiated approach may observe that this is what both
the Commission and the Court in fact did-or at least tried to do. The
Commission dedicated much of its work to carefully documenting human rights
330
violations in the country. However, under the approach I defend here, the
Court should have used that information to lay the groundwork for the Court's
more aggressive approach towards the State. Of course, Venezuela might have
ultimately made the same decision it did: to withdraw from the American
Convention. But the Court would have been in a better position to protect itself
and the system from accusations of intervention when other countries lashed out
against the Court or the system, as happened during the "strengthening
process."331 In the next section, I come back to this point, where I develop my
proposal for a political, or "hybrid," rather than a juridical, model of ensuring
compliance.
Second, human rights bodies may also articulate criteria to differentiate
among cases depending on the type of violations alleged by the petitioners.
According to the inter-American system's existing case law, for instance,
decisions on how States organize their electoral systems enjoy a higher degree
of deference. 332 Additionally, in the 1980s, the Court considered States'
decisions on granting citizenship to warrant more deference.33 3 However,
according to more recent cases against the Dominican Republic, the Court seems
to have changed its doctrine on citizenship 334 but has yet to explain this change
or its extent definitively. Was the change warranted by the nature of alleged
violations? Or their magnitude? Or maybe the State against which the petitions
were filed? The Court overlooked these questions. With a fourth instance
doctrine that fails to make crucial distinctions, it is harder to rationally reconcile
the Court's decisions when they seem to be in tension with prior rulings.
I argue that the fourth instance test should consider three factors: 1) an
inquiry into whether the respondent State is one where courts are independent
and impartial; 2) whether or not the domestic decision under review is a reasoned
329. See Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela, OEA/Ser.L/V/II
doc. 54 (Dec. 30, 2009); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A DECADE UNDER CHAVEZ: POLITICAL INTOLERANCE
AND LOST OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADVANCING HUMAN RIGHTS IN VENEZUELA (Sep. 18, 2008).
330. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has released three full-scale reports on
the situation of human rights in Venezuela: in 2003, 2009 and 2017. For the most recent of these reports,
see Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Democratic Institutions, the Rule ofLaw and Human Rights in Venezuela,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II doc. 209 (Dec. 31, 2017).
331. See supra Part IV.B.
332. Castafieda-Gutman v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 184 (Aug. 6, 2008).
333. Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica,
Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 4 (Jan. 19, 1984).
334. See supra Part IV.A.I.
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ruling; and 3) the type of violation alleged by petitioners-i.e. is it a non-
derogable right, such as the right not to be tortured, or a peripheral aspect of a
right that could legitimately be subject to restriction? Revitalizing the fourth
instance doctrine would give the Court's case law stability by making its
judgments more predictable, and would protect the Court from accusations of
undue intervention.
Finally, a differentiated approach could have an impact on the Court's
remedial jurisprudence. In its rebuke of the Inter-American Court's judgment,
the Supreme Court of Argentina challenged the Inter-American Court's power
to issue a specific remedy (the revocation of a domestic judicial decision),
accusing the Inter-American Court of going beyond its powers, affecting its
legitimacy and authority. By revising the fourth instance doctrine, the Inter-
American Court could engage with States to devise appropriate mechanisms for
compliance. The Court seems to believe that its most prominent means of
interaction with domestic courts is through the conventionality control doctrine,
whereby domestic courts are bound by the Inter-American Court's
interpretations of rights.336 By introducing a differentiated approach toward the
fourth instance doctrine, the Court could send an unequivocal message to its
domestic partners-i.e., constitutional judges-that the Inter-American Court's
goal is to work with them, not against them.
B. Political Compliance
Compliance is one of the most important and difficult themes in
international law. 337 To ensure compliance, international courts must necessarily
engage with domestic actors-both governmental and non-governmental. Many
instances of resistance that this Article explores are based on States' pushback
against the Inter-American Court's push for compliance. Analyzing the Court's
compliance methods is therefore critical in order to address the underlying
problem of resistance. I argue for a shift in how the system should carry out
compliance and enforcement: instead of using the current legalized compliance
335. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n, supra note 2, ¶ 11. See Harlan Grant Cohen et a].,
Legitimacy and International Courts-A Framework, in LEGITIMACY AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS 1, 5
(Nienke Grossman et al. eds., 2018) ("[A] court that acts beyond the scope of authority granted to it, or
ultra vires, exceeds the bounds of state consent and lacks justified authority.").
336. See generally Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor, Conventionality Control: The New Doctrine of
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 109 AJIL UNBOUND 93 (2015) (discussing the evolution of
the conventionality control doctrine at the IACHR).
337. There is a wide range of theories regarding compliance in international law. See, e.g.,
MARKUS BURGSTALLER, THEORIES OF COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004) (outlining a
typology of theories of compliance with international law); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based
Theory ofInternational Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1827 (2002) (setting forth a compliance theory of
"rational, self-interested states .. . concern[ed] about both reputational and direct sanctions triggered by
violations of the law"); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L. J.
2599, 2603 (1997) (arguing that a "process of interaction, interpretation, and internalization of
international norms into domestic legal systems is pivotal to understanding why nations 'obey'
international law, rather than merely conform their behavior to it when convenient"); Beth A. Simmons,
International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs,
94 AM. POL. SC. REv. 819, 819 (2000) ("An international legal commitment is one way that governments
seek to raise the reputational costs of reneging, with important consequences for state behavior.").
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mechanism, whereby the Court itself monitors State compliance, I argue that
States and non-governmental organizations should also-or even instead-take
up the responsibility of assessing compliance.
1. The Court's Self-Asserted Monitoring Jurisdiction
Unlike the European human rights system, with traditionally higher levels
of compliance,33 8 but a much narrower jurisprudence on remedies, the inter-
American human rights system has to deal with a structural lack of
enforcement. 3 3 9 Most States do not comply with the Court's judgments, except
for the Court's orders to pay just satisfaction to victims of violations. 34 0
As seen in the case of Peru's attempt to withdraw from the Inter-American
Court's contentious jurisdiction, Latin American States have persistently failed
to hold other States accountable for their lack of compliance or their utter
disregard for inter-American human rights norms. 34 1 States passively sat by
while a member State directly challenged not just the Court, but the very norms
of the system. It was the Court, not OAS member States, that stepped up to
declare that a partial withdrawal was not possible under inter-American human
rights law.
Such passivity comes at a cost. Without specific norms detailing the
method for compliance, the Court, under the compdtence-compdtence
principle,34 2 ruled that the power to supervise the execution of its judgments falls
upon the Court itself.34 Such assertion of power is unprecedented in
international law; international courts generally do not supervise compliance
with their own judgments. 3  The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stands
as a salient exception to the general rule.
From this judicial enlargement of powers, the Court has developed an
338. Alexandra Huneeus, Compliance with Judgments and Decisions, in OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (Karen Alter, et al. eds., 2013); Fernando Basch et al., The
Effectiveness of The Inter-American System ofHuman Rights Protection: A Quantitative Approach to its
Functioning and Compliance with its Decisions, 7 SUR-INT'L J. HUM RTs. 9 (2010); Damian Gonzalez-
Salzberg, Do States Comply with the Compulsory Judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights? An Empirical Study ofthe Compliance with 330 Measures ofReparation, 13 REVISTA INSTITUTO
BRASILEIRO DIREITOS HUMANOS 93 (2013); Courtney Hillebrecht, Rethinking Compliance: The
Challenges and Prospects of Measuring Compliance with International Human Rights Tribunals, 1 J.
HUM. RTS. PRAC. 362 (2009).
339. See David C. Baluarte, Strategizing for Compliance: The Evolution of a Compliance Phase
ofInter-American Court Litigation and the Strategic Imperative for Victims' Representatives, 27 AM. U.
INT'L L. REv. 263 (2012).
340. Much of the European human rights system's record of compliance comes from the
European Court's strong emphasis on monetary compensation. Monetary compensation is also routine in
inter-American human rights case law, and States tend to comply with the remedy within a reasonable
time. But along with monetary remedies, the Inter-American Court's decisions order many more remedies:
from the erection of memorials to honor victims of human rights violations, to judicial training programs,
to constitutional reforms. See Thomas M. Antkowiak, Remedial Approaches to Human Rights Violations:
The Inter-American Court ofHuman Rights and Beyond, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 351 (2008).
341. See supra Part IV.A..
342. See supra text accompanying note 134.
343. Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama, Competence, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No.
104, IM 68, 84-93 (Nov. 28, 2003).
344. Madsen et al., supra note 305 ("[International courts] ultimately play a limited role with
regard ... to the enforcement of their rulings . . . .").
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extensive case law on "compliance." 34 5 It is routine for the Court to convene
hearings both to address the merits of a case as well as to follow up on the
enforcement of merits judgments. In compliance judgments, the Court examines
the measures it ordered the State to adopt, reviews information provided by both
petitioners and State officials, and issues a monitoring judgment.
This compliance system creates at least two kinds of problems. First, the
mechanism has no basis in actual treaties, nor does it find legal footing in
customary international law or inter-American human rights law. It is an instance
of judicially-made law. This is problematic because the Court exercises
jurisdiction in a region where statutes-i.e. treaties in this case-are the primary
source of law, and some States have become discontented with the lax
methodology by which the Court creates rules and doctrines. States have stronger
reasons to resist court orders that have shaky or no legal basis. Hence, the Court's
expansion of its authority through judicially-created rules may perpetuate or
even exacerbate States' lack of compliance with the court orders.3 6
Second, the current judicial monitoring mechanism exposes the Court's
diminished authority. The Court orders States to comply, and States refuse to do
so. The Court insists on compliance through "monitoring judgments" which, in
turn, States may refuse to follow. Sometimes such refusal occurs when States
simply ignore the Court's order or delay responding; other times, the national
courts' resistance is open and upfront. Such dynamics may damage the Court's
authority in the eyes of its stakeholders: States, civil society organizations,
advocates, and human rights victims. International courts lack the enforcement
powers that domestic courts have: unlike domestic courts, international courts
exert auctoritas, rather than potestas.34 7 Hence, when States routinely ignore an
international court's order, it is the international court's legitimacy that is in
348
peril.3
2. Reexamining Monitoring Jurisdiction
To address the two problems that I have identified-the lack of legal
footing for the Inter-American Court's monitoring jurisdiction and the
weakening of the Court's auctoritas-two steps could be taken. First, the Court
should reexamine its monitoring jurisdiction. Second, compliance mechanisms
and procedures should also be reassessed.
It is implausible that the Inter-American Court-or any court, for that
matter-will simply give up the power to monitor compliance with its
judgments. If anything, the Court has been expanding, not shrinking, its
345. The Court has issued almost 200 monitoring compliance judgments and more than 370
merits judgments. See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ANNUAL REPORT 88 (2018),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/informe2018/ingles.pdf; Inter-American Court, Decisions and
Judgments, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/cf/Jurisprudencia2/busquedacasoscontenciosos.cfm?lang-en.
346. On the Court's expansion of its own powers to create legal doctrine, see Contesse, supra
note 60.
347. See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 74-88 (2005).
348. See Erik Voeten, International Judicial Independence, in INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 436 (Mark Pollack & Jeffrey
Dunoff eds., 2012).
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jurisdiction. However, as I have demonstrated, the Court's expansive case law
can incite pushback from States. And if pushback persists, it can end in frontal
backlash. Thus, the Court cannot afford to ignore the problem.
To reexamine its monitoring jurisdiction, the Court should make an effort
to engage with States in a non-top-down manner. Refashioning the fourth
instance doctrine can serve this goal. By laying out clear criteria and a
differentiated approach as to how it engages with States, the Court can send a
message to one of its main constituencies: domestic judges.35 0 The message will
be that the Inter-American Court does not seek to "review" or "correct" national
courts' decisions, thus addressing the concern that several constitutional justices
expressed when interviewed for this study.
Further, the Court should also engage with other branches of government.
Although executive officials are the ones who appear before the Court, in both
merits and monitoring hearings, the Court engages mostly with domestic judges
through the exercise of conventionality control. The Court seems to engage far
less with national parliaments, and some commentators have in fact argued that
the Court should increase those interactions.3 51 Hence, the Court needs to engage
with States through political, not solely judicial, means.
3. Revising Compliance Mechanisms and Procedures
The second step that the inter-American human rights system as a whole,
not just the Court, should take is a revision of current compliance mechanisms
and procedures. This revision should consider the norms of the American
Convention. Looking to the European human rights system may provide
guidance as to how the inter-American system could accomplish this. I do not
argue that OAS States should adopt the European mechanisms; rather, States
should consider how some European features might be applied in the context of
inter-American human rights law.
In Europe, enforcement of the judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights falls upon the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.352 The
Committee is comprised of foreign ministers from each member State, and is the
executive body of the Court. The European Court's rulings are forwarded to the
Committee, which determines how compliance should be carried out.
Additionally, the Committee decides the consequences and the course of action
to be taken if a State is found to be out of compliance with a ruling of the Court.
The Committee of Ministers' power is based on the Convention as well as on the
States' individual reliance on the Committee's role in settling disputes.
349. See Madsen et al., supra note 305, at 207-08.
350. See Huneeus, supra note 265, at 495.
351. See, e.g., Leiv Marsteintredet, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the
Mobilisation of Parliaments, in THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS JUDICIARY AND NATIONAL
PARLIAMENTS: EUROPE AND BEYOND 248, 249 (Matthew Saul et al. eds., 2017) ("The crucial dilemma to
be discussed in this chapter is how the IACtHR can engage and mobilise national parliaments to improve
and strengthen the protection of human rights without the reforms being perceived by member states as
another imposition from the Court and thus increase the risk of backlash.").
352. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Foundational
Freedoms arts. 39.4, 46.2-46.5, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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Compliance in Europe is higher than in the inter-American system. One
reason for the difference lies in the type of remedies that the two courts tend to
order: the European Court has traditionally ordered monetary compensation as
the main remedy (which is easier to comply with and, in tm, to monitor). In
contrast, the Inter-American Court's remedial jurisprudence is far broader and
more complex. 353 But European human rights compliance may also be higher
because the task of ensuring compliance lies with the regional members that
make up the organization, namely, the Council of Europe. The processes involve
political negotiations with which courts have nothing, or very little, to do. In the
inter-American compliance mechanism, on the other hand, the Inter-American
Court places itself in the middle of political and diplomatic battles under the
guise of legal disputes, which causes the Court to spend resources engaging with
States in interactions that routinely prove to be unproductive. That interaction
should be left to the political bodies of the OAS, such as the Permanent Council.
. However, considering the recent experience of the "strengthening
process," 354 the mechanism of political compliance should not be left solely to
OAS' political bodies. Latin American civil society has been crucial to the
development of inter-American human rights law. Just as non-governmental
organizations may have standing before certain United Nations bodies, so too
should the OAS consider establishing permanent consultation mechanisms with
civil society organizations. Those mechanisms should include the monitoring
phase of the Inter-American Court's rulings. Civil society organizations could
register in an open process to ensure robust participation and close scrutiny. 355
Establishing mechanisms of political compliance may require the revision
of major legal instruments, such as the 1969 American Convention on Human
Rights. Fifty years after the adoption of the major inter-American treaty seems
an appropriate time to undertake a responsible revision of some of its norms.
Furthermore, opening up a revision process should enable OAS States to reiterate
their commitment to the system and, perhaps, bring back the States that have
abandoned it, with the ultimate goal of universalization-that is, the ratification
of the treaty by all OAS States.
VI. CONCLUSION
In June 2017, the American Society of International Law convened a panel
discussion with a judge from the European Court of Human Rights and another
353. See Thomas M. Antkowiak, Remedial Approaches to Human Rights Violations: The Inter-
American Court ofHuman Rights and Beyond, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 351 (2008).
354. See supra Part IV.B.
355. In Europe, the Committee of Ministers is "entitled to consider any communication from
non-governmental organisations, as well as national institutions for the promotion and protection of
human rights, with regard to the execution of judgments." See Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe Rules for the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and of the Terms of Friendly Settlements,
Rule 9.2 (Jan. 18, 2017) (as amended), https://rm.coe.int/16806eebf0. In 2016, European lawyers and
academics established the European Implementation Network, which "advocate[s] for the full and timely
implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights," organizing "regular NGO
briefings with the Committee of Ministers, which supervises the implementation of human rights
judgments." See Overview of the Network, EUR. IMPLEMENTATION NETWORK,
http://www.eirmetwork.org/implementation-activities (last visited Apr. 19, 2019).
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from the Inter-American Court (who is currently the Court's president). The
topic was "backlash against regional human rights courts."3 56 The European
judge addressed several contentious issues that the European Court has faced,
such as the Hirst decision against the United Kingdom and the Russian
Federation's response to the judgments of the European Court discussed
above. 3 57 The Inter-American judge, however, took a different path. He observed
that "instead of talking about 'backlash' [he] prefer[red] to talk about the
'challenges' that the inter-American system is facing."3 58 He then moved to
address the system's financial constraints, the need for all States to ratify the
American Convention, the virtues of the Court's expansive case law, the need to
address social rights, and the problems of compliance. It was only when Judge
Ferrer addressed the latter issue that he mentioned two cases discussed in this
Article: Gelman and Fontevecchia. However, instead of analyzing the difficult
issues around the two cases, he merely noted them as examples of some of the
compliance "challenges" that the system faces.
Judge Ferrer's meager account of backlash against the inter-American
system suggests that the Court may not be attentive enough to the issues
discussed in this Article. With greater scrutiny upon the Court's work in its
different forms of engagement with States, and the rise of nationalist views in
several parts of the world, including Latin America, it is vital for the organs of
the inter-American human rights system to take care to justify the exercise and
extent of their legal authority. Human rights institutions around the world are
under attack. To address those attacks, human rights courts must identify how
States challenge the authority of human rights law.
This Article offers a description of the multiple forms of resistance that the
inter-American human rights system faces, as well as a framework that
distinguishes the types of resistance against human rights bodies. It provides a
historical account of several instances of resistance, identifying, first, episodes
of frontal backlash against both the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights-for instance, when States
withdraw, either partially or fully, from the regional human rights system. It then
analyzes instances of diplomatic pushback-specifically, when States conducted
a reform process of the two regional human rights bodies (with an emphasis on
the Commission) and when domestic courts challenged the Inter-American
Court's authority, either by indirectly finding that a State should not be bound
by the Court's decisions (as in the Dominican case) or by directly confronting
the Court's doctrines (as in the Argentinean case).
Finally, this Article argues for specific paths for reform that could help the
system address instances of resistance. First, the Article suggests a revision of
judicial doctrines on engagement with States-in particular, a revision of the
356. Luis Lopez Guerra, Judge, European Court of Human Rights & Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor
Poisot, Judge, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, American Society of International Law Panel on
The Backlash against Regional Human Rights. Systems: An Ongoing Concern (Jun. 2, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-cufc6BI2St4).
357. See supra Part III.A.
358. Lopez Guerra & Mac-Gregor Poisot, supra note 356.
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"fourth instance" doctrine, whereby international courts carefully articulate the
scope and limitations of their interventions in domestic policy and regulations.
Second, the Article suggests consideration of political mechanisms for ensuring
compliance, which would allow the Inter-American Court to engage with
member States in less judicialized ways and thus create more productive
dynamics and interactions between States and human rights organs.
The prescriptions that the Article offers could be applied to other regional
and international human rights systems as well, as pushback against international
courts seems only to be increasing. To determine whether or not, and how, these
mechanisms could be applied to those other regimes, such as the African or
European human rights systems, further research is needed.

